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VALUE IN MIXED STRATEGIES FOR ZERO-SUM STOCHASTIC
DIFFERENTIAL GAMES WITHOUT ISAACS CONDITION
By Rainer Buckdahn1, Juan Li2 and Marc Quincampoix1
Universite´ de Bretagne Occidentale and Shandong University, Shandong
University, Weihai, and Universite´ de Bretagne Occidentale
In the present work, we consider 2-person zero-sum stochastic dif-
ferential games with a nonlinear pay-off functional which is defined
through a backward stochastic differential equation. Our main objec-
tive is to study for such a game the problem of the existence of a value
without Isaacs condition. Not surprising, this requires a suitable con-
cept of mixed strategies which, to the authors’ best knowledge, was
not known in the context of stochastic differential games. For this,
we consider nonanticipative strategies with a delay defined through a
partition pi of the time interval [0, T ]. The underlying stochastic con-
trols for the both players are randomized along pi by a hazard which
is independent of the governing Brownian motion, and knowing the
information available at the left time point tj−1 of the subintervals
generated by pi, the controls of Players 1 and 2 are conditionally in-
dependent over [tj−1, tj). It is shown that the associated lower and
upper value functions W π and Uπ converge uniformly on compacts
to a function V , the so-called value in mixed strategies, as the mesh
of pi tends to zero. This function V is characterized as the unique
viscosity solution of the associated Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman–Isaacs
equation.
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2 R. BUCKDAHN, J. LI AND M. QUINCAMPOIX
1. Introduction. In our work, we investigate 2-person zero-sum stochas-
tic differential games which dynamics are defined by a doubly controlled
stochastic differential equation (SDE)
dXt,x;u,vs = b(s,X
t,x;u,v
s , us, vs)ds
+ σ(s,Xt,x;u,vs , us, vs)dBs, s ∈ [t, T ],(1.1)
Xt,x;u,vt = x ∈Rd,
driven by a Brownian motion B, and endowed with pay-off functionals de-
fined through a doubly controlled backward stochastic differential equation
(BSDE) (see Section 2 for details) which, in the classical case, reduces to
I(t, x;u, v) =E
[
Φ(Xt,x;u,vT ) +
∫ T
t
f(s,Xt,x;u,vs , us, vs)ds
]
(1.2)
[see (3.21)]. The initial data (t, x) of the game belong to [0, T ] × Rd, and
the control processes u = (us) and v = (vs) used by Players 1 and 2, take
their values in compact metric spaces U and V , respectively. While the ob-
jective of Player 1 is to maximize the pay-off I(t, x;u, v), that of Player 2
is to minimize it: Indeed, for Player 2 I(t, x;u, v) represents a cost func-
tional. However, apart from rather strong assumptions on the coefficients,
for example, that of independence of the controls (u, v) and of strict ellip-
ticity for the diffusion coefficient σσ∗(t, x) ≥ α · IRd , (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd, for
some α > 0 (refer to Hamadene, Lepeltier, and Peng [11]), if one wants to
have a dynamic programming principle (DPP) the players can, in general,
not play a game of the type “control against control”; they can play, for
instance, games of the type “nonanticipative strategy against control” (see,
e.g., [3, 10]) or games of the type “NAD-strategy against NAD-strategy”,
where NAD stands for nonanticipativity with delay (see, e.g., [2] and [1]).
However, a central question in the theory of 2-person zero-sum stochastic
differential games is that of sufficient conditions, under which the game ad-
mits a value, that is, under which the lower and the upper value functions of
the stochastic differential game coincide. In the literature, since the famous
works by Isaacs [12] for the case of deterministic differential games and that
by Fleming and Souganidis [10] for stochastic differential games (see also
[9]), various authors have shown the equality between the lower and the
upper value functions under the so-called Isaacs condition.
Let us be more precise: Generalizing the pioneering paper on stochastic
differential games by Fleming and Souganidis [10], Buckdahn and Li [3], and
also Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Quincampoix [1], associated the dynamics
(1.1) with nonlinear cost functionals defined through a BSDE, which was
first introduced by Pardoux and Peng [17]:{−dY t,x;u,vs = f(s,Xt,x;u,vs , Y t,x;u,vs ,Zt,x;u,vs , us, vs)ds−Zt,x;u,vs dBs,
Y t,x;u,vT =Φ(X
t,x;u,v
T ), s ∈ [t, T ].
(1.3)
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They considered as pay-off functional the random variable (measurable with
respect to the information available before the beginning of the game)
J(t, x;u, v) = Y t,x;u,vt ,(1.4)
and the lower and the upper value functions for the game over the time
interval [t, T ] were introduced, respectively, by putting
W (t, x) := ess sup
α
ess inf
β
J(t, x;α,β),
(1.5)
U(t, x) := ess inf
β
ess sup
α
J(t, x;α,β) (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd,
where α runs the NAD-strategies for Player 1 and β those for Player 2. Given
such a couple of admissible NAD-strategies, the cost functional J(t, x;α,β)
is defined through the unique couple of admissible controls (u, v) satis-
fying α(v) = u,β(u) = v, by putting J(t, x;α,β) = J(t, x;u, v) (e.g., refer
to [1]). We emphasize that in the above definition the classical case, where
f(s,x, y, z, u, v) = f(s,x,u, v) is independent of (y, z), can be obtained by
replacing J(t, x;α,β) by E[J(t, x;α,β)] = I(t, x;α,β) [see (1.2)] and the es-
sential supremum and the essential infimum over a family of random vari-
ables by the supremum and the infimum, respectively; this does not change
the upper and the lower value functions (see Remark 3.4, [3]). The authors
showed that, for the Hamiltonians
H(t, x, y, p,A,u, v) =
1
2
tr(σσ∗(t, x, u, v)A) + b(t, x, u, v)p
+ f(t, x, y, pσ(t, x, u, v), u, v),
(1.6)
H−(t, x, y, p,A) = sup
u∈U
inf
v∈V
H(t, x, y, p,A,u, v),
H+(t, x, y, p,A) = inf
v∈V
sup
u∈U
H(t, x, y, p,A,u, v),
(t, x, y, p,A) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd×R×Rd×Sd (Sd denotes the space of symmetric
real matrices of the size d× d), W and U are the unique viscosity solutions
of the following Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman–Isaacs (HJBI) equations in the
class of continuous functions with polynomial growth, respectively:
∂
∂t
W (t, x) +H−(t, x, (W,∇W,D2W )(t, x)) = 0, W (T,x) = Φ(x),
(1.7)
∂
∂t
U(t, x) +H+(t, x, (U,∇U,D2U)(t, x)) = 0, U(T,x) = Φ(x).
Isaacs condition says that
H−(t, x, y, p,A) =H+(t, x, y, p,A)
(1.8)
(t, x, y, p,A) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd ×R×Rd × Sd,
and under it the both above PDEs coincide and the uniqueness of the solu-
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tion implies that W (t, x) = U(t, x), (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd, that is, the game has
a value.
But how to get a value, when Isaacs condition is not assumed? Recently,
in [4] the authors studied deterministic differential games without assuming
Isaacs condition. They considered an adequate notion of mixed strategies
related with a suitable randomization, and were thus able to prove that
such defined upper and lower value functions coincide, and that this value
function defined through mixed strategies satisfies a Hamilton–Jacobi–Isaacs
equation. We also refer to the works of Chentsov, Krasovskii and Subbotin
for the existence of the value of deterministic differential games [14, 20]: They
studied the problems of deterministic differential games without Isaacs con-
dition through positional strategies but with techniques which differ from
those in [4]. To the authors’ best knowledge, there does not exist any work
on the existence of the value of stochastic differential games without assum-
ing Isaacs condition, it has been an open problem until now. However, there
are also different recent works studying stochastic differential games with-
out Isaacs’ condition, but without the objective to show the existence of a
value of the game. For instance, Krylov [15, 16] studied regularity properties
and the dynamic programming principle for the upper value function of a
stochastic differential game over a domain, by starting from the Isaacs equa-
tion; for this he used the idea of S´wie¸ch [21] that the viscosity solutions of
nondegenerate Isaacs equations have some regularity properties which can
be used for the approach.
In the present work, our objective is to solve this open problem, that
is, to extend the results of [4] from deterministic differential games with-
out Isaacs condition to stochastic differential games. Since this work was
heavily inspired by [4], we consider the game of the type “NAD-straegies
against NAD-strategies”. The delay of the nonanticipative strategies is de-
fined through a partition π = {0 = t0 < t < t1 < · · · < tn = T} of the time
interval [0, T ]. The underlying stochastic controls for the both players are
randomized along the partition π by a hazard which is independent of the
governing Brownian motion, and knowing all information available at the left
time point tj−1 of the subintervals generated by π, the controls of Players 1
and 2 are conditionally independent over [tj−1, tj).
While the dynamics are defined by (1.1), the BSDE defining the pay-off
functional has to take into account that, first, the controls of the both players
are randomized by a hazard independent of the governing Brownian motion,
and second, the both players make the randomization of their controls con-
ditionally independent of each other and reveal the information related with
only at the end of each subinterval generated by the partition π. This has
as consequence that the BSDE has to be considered under a filtration F˜π
which is smaller than the filtration Fπ (but larger than the Brownian one)
for the dynamics (1.1); see BSDE (2.3).
VALUE IN MIXED STRATEGIES FOR ZERO-SUM SDGS 5
With the help of the cost functional defined through our BSDE we intro-
duce the lower and the upper value functions along a partition π, W π and
Uπ. For these, a priori, random fields we prove that they are deterministic
and satisfy along the partition π, at its points, the dynamic programming
principle. This dynamic programming principle combined with Peng’s BSDE
method, refer to Peng [18], which we have to redevelop for our settings here
is crucial for the proof that W π and Uπ converge uniformly on compacts,
as the mesh of π tends to zero, and their limit V , the so-called value in
mixed strategies can be characterized as the unique viscosity solution of the
Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman–Isaacs equation
∂
∂t
V (t, x) + sup
µ∈P(U)
inf
ν∈P(V )
H(t, x, (V,∇V,D2V )(t, x), µ, ν) = 0,
(1.9)
V (T,x) = Φ(x),
where
H(t, x, y, p,A,µ, ν)
=
∫
U×V
(
1
2
tr(σσ∗(t, x, u, v)A) + b(t, x, u, v)p(1.10)
+ f(t, x, y, pσ(t, x, u, v), u, v)
)
µ⊗ ν(dudv),
(t, x, y, p,A) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd×R×Rd×Sd. Here P(U) denotes the space of all
probability measures on U , P(V ) all on V . Since both control state spaces
U and V are supposed to be compact and metric, P(U) and P(V ) are
convex and compact, and from the bi-linearity of H(t, x, y, p,A,µ, ν) in (µ, ν)
we have that for PDE (1.9) the following Isaacs condition is automatically
satisfied:
sup
µ∈P(U)
inf
ν∈P(V )
H(t, x, y, p,A,µ, ν)
(1.11)
= inf
ν∈P(V )
sup
µ∈P(U)
H(t, x, y, p,A,µ, ν).
Of course, PDE (1.9) could have been also derived by considering weak
controls, that is, controls with values in P(U) and P(U), but our objective
has been to work with controls taking values in U and V , respectively, even
for the price of a randomization.
Let us point out that the fact that, in our approach, the dynamics and
the BSDE have to be studied under different filtration, means that unlike
in [3] and [1] we are not anymore in a Markovian framework here for our
BSDE. This requires new approaches, not only for the redevelopment of
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Peng’s BSDE method [18] in our settings (Section 4), but also for the proof
that the upper and the lower value functions are deterministic and Ho¨lder
continuous with respect to the time parameter.
Let us explain the organization of the paper. In Section 2, we introduce the
settings for our stochastic differential games, we define for both players the
space of admissible controls along a partition π as well as the notion of NAD-
strategies with respect to π. Moreover, we introduce the dynamics, the pay-
off functional defined through a BSDE, as well as the upper and the lower
value functions W π and Uπ along π. In Section 3, we study properties of
W π and Uπ. We show, in particular, that they are deterministic continuous
functions which, with respect to the points of the partition π, satisfy the
dynamic programming principle. In Section 4, finally, it is shown that, as the
mesh of π tends to zero, W π and Uπ converge uniformly on compacts to the
unique viscosity solution of the associated Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman–Isaacs
equation. For this, Peng’s BSDE method is redeveloped for our settings.
2. Preliminaries. Settings of the stochastic differential games. Let us
begin with introducing the probability space
(Ω1,F1, P1) := ((R2)N,B(R2)⊗N,Q⊗N2 ),
where Q2 denotes the two-dimensional standard Normal distribution on the
real plane R2 endowed with its Borel σ-field B(R2), and N is the set of all
positive integers. Then, by the above definition, Ω1 = (R
2)N is the space of
all R2-valued sequences ρ = (ρj = (ρj,1, ρj,2))j≥1, and F1 = B(R2)⊗N is the
product Borel σ-field taken over the sequence of σ-fields, which all elements
coincide with B(R2), and P1 =Q⊗N2 is the product measure over (Ω1,F1).
Let us denote the coordinate mappings on Ω1 by ζj = (ζj,1, ζj,2) :Ω1 → R2,
j ≥ 1:
ζj(ρ) = (ζj,1(ρ), ζj,2(ρ)) = (ρj,1, ρj,2), ρ= ((ρj,1, ρj,2))j≥1 ∈Ω1.
We observe that F1 coincides with the smallest σ-field on Ω1, with respect
to which all coordinate mappings ζj , j ≥ 1, are measurable.
However, for the study of our stochastic differential games we also need
the classical Wiener space (Ω2,F2, P2), where Ω2 is the set of all continuous
functions from [0, T ] with values in Rd and starting from zero, endowed with
the supremum norm [i.e., Ω2 = C0([0, T ];R
d)], and F2 is the Borel σ-field
on Ω2 completed with respect to the Wiener measure P2 under which the
coordinate process Bt(ω
′) = ω′(t), t ∈ [0, T ], ω′ ∈Ω2, is a Brownian motion.
Let us denote by (Ω,F , P ) the product probability space
(Ω,F , P ) = (Ω1,F1, P1)⊗ (Ω2,F2, P2),
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which we complete with respect to the probability measure P , and let us
extend the coordinate mappings ζ and B in a canonical way from Ω1 and
Ω2, respectively, to Ω:
ζj(ω) := ζj(ρ), Bt(ω) :=Bt(ω
′) = ω′(t),
ω = (ρ,ω′) ∈Ω=Ω1 ×Ω2, j ≥ 1, t ∈ [0, T ].
Let us now introduce the filtration with which we work on our probability
space (Ω,F , P ). By FB = (FBt )t∈[0,T ] we denote the filtration generated by
the Brownian motion B and completed by all P -null sets. In addition to the
filtration FB , we also need larger ones, defined along a partition π = {0 =
t0 < t1 < · · · < tn = T} of the interval [0, T ]. Given such a partition π, we
define Fπ,i = (Fπ,it )t∈[0,T ], with
Fπ,it =FBt ∨ σ{ζℓ = (ζℓ,1, ζℓ,2)(1≤ ℓ≤ j − 1), ζj,i},
t ∈ [tj−1, tj), 1≤ j ≤ n, i= 1,2, and we put Fπ,iT =Fπ,iT−, i= 1,2. Notice that,
for j = 1, that is, on the time interval [t0, t1), by convention, Fπ,it = FBt ∨
σ{ζ1,i}, i = 1,2. We shall also introduce the filtration Fπ = Fπ,1 ∨ Fπ,2 =
(Fπt =Fπ,1t ∨Fπ,2t )t∈[0,T ], and we remark that, for t ∈ [tj−1, tj),
Fπt =FBt ∨Hj where Hj := σ{ζℓ = (ζℓ,1, ζℓ,2)(1≤ ℓ≤ j)}.
Finally, we will also need a smaller filtration, F˜π = (F˜πt )t∈[0,T ] with F˜πt :=
FBt ∨ Hj−1, for t ∈ [tj−1, tj),1 ≤ j ≤ n. Observe that, for all t ∈ [tj−1, tj),
knowing F˜πt = FBt ∨Hj−1, the σ-fields Fπ,1t and Fπ,2t are conditionally in-
dependent.
Let us consider two compact metric spaces U and V as control state spaces
used by the Players 1 and 2, respectively. By P(U) and P(V ), we denote
the space of all probability measures over U and V , endowed with its Borel
σ-field B(U) and B(V ), respectively. We also observe that it is an immediate
consequence of Skorohod’s Representation theorem that the set P(U) [resp.,
P(V )] coincides with the set of the laws of all U -valued (resp., V -valued)
random variables defined over ([0,1],B([0,1]), λ1) [λ1 denotes the Lebesgue
measure on ([0,1],B([0,1]))]. But this latter set coincides with that of the
laws of all random variables defined over (R,B(R),Q1), where Q1 denotes
the standard Normal distribution over (R,B(R)). Indeed, denoting by
Φ0,1(x) =
1√
2π
∫ x
−∞
exp
{
−y
2
2
}
dy, x ∈R,
we have that, for any random variable ξ over ([0,1],B([0,1]), λ1), the law
of ξ with respect to λ1 coincides with that of ξ(Φ0,1(·)) :R→ R under Q1.
A consequence is that
P(U) = {Pξ : ξ is U -valued random variable over (Ω, σ{ζj,1}, P )}
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and
P(V ) = {Pξ : ξ is V -valued random variable over (Ω, σ{ζj,2}, P )}
for all j ≥ 1.
Let us now introduce the admissible controls for both players along a
given partition π = {0 = t0 < t1 < · · ·< tn = T} of the time interval [0, T ].
Definition 2.1 (Admissible controls). Given a partition π of the time
interval [0, T ] and an initial time t ∈ [0, T ], the space of admissible controls
along the partition π for Player 1 for a game over the time interval [t, T ] is
the totality of all U -valued Fπ,1-predictable processes u= (us)s∈[t,T ] defined
over the probability space (Ω,F , P ); it is denoted by Uπt,T . For Player 2 the
space of admissible controls along the partition π Vπt,T is defined similarly:
It is the collection of all V -valued Fπ,2-predictable processes v = (vs)s∈[t,T ]
defined over (Ω,F , P ).
After having introduced the spaces of admissible controls, we describe
now the dynamics of our stochastic differential games. For this, we consider
the coefficients
b : [0, T ]×Rd ×U × V →Rd and σ : [0, T ]×Rd×U × V →Rd×d
which we suppose throughout our work to be bounded, jointly continuous
and Lipschitz in x ∈ Rd, uniformly with respect to (t, u, v) ∈ [0, T ] × U ×
V . Let π be a partition of the time interval [0, T ]. Then, given arbitrary
initial data t ∈ [0, T ] and ϑ ∈ L2(Ω,Fπt , P ;Rd) as well as admissible control
processes u ∈ Uπt,T and v ∈ Vπt,T , we consider the SDE
dXt,ϑ;u,vs = b(s,X
t,ϑ;u,v
s , us, vs)ds+ σ(s,X
t,ϑ;u,v
s , us, vs)dBs
(2.1)
s ∈ [t, T ],Xt,ϑ;u,vt = ϑ.
Under our assumptions on the coefficients b and σ, this SDE has a unique
strong solution Xt,ϑ;u,v = (Xt,ϑ;u,vs )s∈[t,T ] in the space of R
d-valued, Fπ-
adapted continuous processes. Moreover, we have the following estimates
which are by now standard.
For all p ≥ 2, there exists some constant Cp ∈ R (only depending on p,
on the Lipschitz constants and the bounds of b and σ) such that, for all
partitions π of [0, T ], for all t ∈ [0, T ], ϑ,ϑ′ ∈ L2(Ω,Fπt , P ;Rd) and all u ∈
Uπt,T , v ∈ Vπt,T , it holds, P -a.s.,
E
[
sup
s∈[t,T ]
|Xt,ϑ;u,vs −Xt,ϑ
′;u,v
s |p|Fπt
]
≤ Cp|ϑ− ϑ′|p,
(2.2)
E
[
sup
s∈[t,T ]
|Xt,ϑ;u,vs |p|Fπt
]
≤ Cp(1 + |ϑ|p).
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Let us now come to the pay-off functional which we associate with the
above dynamics of our game. The pay-off functional is a nonlinear, recursive
one, that is, we define it through a backward stochastic differential equation.
For this, we consider the terminal pay-off function Φ :Rd → R which we
suppose to be bounded and Lipschitz, as well as the running pay-off function
f : [0, T ]×Rd×R×Rd×U×V →R which we assume to be jointly continuous
and such that
(i) f(t, x, y, z, u, v) is Lipschitz in (x, y, z) ∈ Rd ×R×Rd, uniformly in
(s,u, v) ∈ [0, T ]×U × V ;
(ii) f(t, x, y, z, u, v) is uniformly continuous on [0, T ]×Rd×R×BK(0)×
U × V , for all K > 0, where BK(0) denotes the closed ball in Rd centered
at 0 with diameter K;
(iii) (t, x, y, u, v)→ f(t, x, y,0, u, v) is bounded.
Given a partition π of the interval [0, T ], initial data t ∈ [0, T ], ϑ ∈ L2(Ω,Fπt ,
P ;Rd) and admissible controls u ∈ Uπt,T , v ∈ Vπt,T , we consider the following
BSDE governed by the solution Xt,ϑ;u,v of SDE (2.1):
dY t,ϑ;u,vs =−E[f(s,Xt,ϑ;u,vs , Y t,ϑ;u,vs ,Zt,ϑ;u,vs , us, vs)|F˜πs ]ds
+Zt,ϑ;u,vs dBs + dM
t,ϑ;u,v
s ,
Y t,ϑ;u,vT =E[Φ(X
t,ϑ;u,v
T )|F˜πT ],
(2.3)
where (E[γs|F˜πs ])s∈[0,T ] is understood as F˜π-optional projection of integrable,
measurable processes γ = (γs)s∈[0,T ].
We say that (Y t,ϑ;u,v,Zt,ϑ;u,v,M t,ϑ;u,v) is a solution of this BSDE, if
(i) Y t,ϑ;u,v ∈ S2
F˜π
(t, T ;R), that is, Y t,ϑ;u,v = (Y t,ϑ;u,vs )s∈[t,T ] is an F˜π-
adapted ca`dla`g process which is square integrable: E[sups∈[t,T ] |Y t,ϑ;u,vs |2]<
+∞;
(ii) Zt,ϑ;u,v ∈ L2
F˜π
(t, T ;Rd), that is, Zt,ϑ;u,v = (Zt,ϑ;u,vs )s∈[t,T ] is an R
d-
valued, F˜π-predictable process such that E[
∫ T
t |Zt,ϑ;u,vs |2 ds]<+∞;
(iii) M t,ϑ;u,v ∈M2
F˜π
(t, T ;R), that is,M t,ϑ;u,v = (M t,ϑ;u,vs )s∈[t,T ] is a square
integrable F˜π-martingale with M t,ϑ;u,vt = 0. Moreover, M
t,ϑ;u,v is supposed
to be orthogonal to the driving Brownian motion B, that is, their joint
quadratic variation process satisfies [B,M t,ϑ;u,v]s = 0, s ∈ [t, T ]. For the proof
of the existence and the uniqueness of the solution of such BSDE (2.3) it is
similar to the classical case, see also [5] and references inside.
We have to emphasize here that since the filtration F˜π is not the Brownian
one, but contains it strictly, we cannot expect to have a solution of the
above BSDE with vanishing M t,ϑ;u,v. It is by now well known that, under
our assumptions on the coefficients f and Φ, a BSDE of the above type
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has a unique solution (Y t,ϑ;u,v,Zt,ϑ;u,v,M t,ϑ;u,v). Moreover, considering the
special form of the filtration F˜π, we can characterize this solution as follows.
Remark 2.1. We first observe that on each of the subintervals [tj−1, tj),
1 ≤ j ≤ n, formed by the partition π = {0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tn = T}, the
filtration F˜π coincides with the Brownian one (FBs )s∈[tj−1,tj) augmented by
the independent σ-field Hj−1. Hence, on the interval [tj−1, tj) we have the
martingale representation property for random variables from L2(Ω, F˜πtj−, P )
with respect to the F˜π-Brownian motion B. This has as consequence that
BSDE (2.3) can be solved over the time intervals [tj−1, tj) with dM
t,ϑ;u,v
s =
0, s ∈ [tj−1, tj). However, for this Y t,ϑ;u,vtj− has to be determined by backward
iteration. In order to compute Y t,ϑ;u,vtn− , we determine from BSDE (2.3) the
jump of the ca`dla`g process Y t,ϑ;u,v at time tn:
△Y t,ϑ;u,vtn (:= Y t,ϑ;u,vtn − Y t,ϑ;u,vtn− ) =△M t,ϑ;u,vtn
that is Y t,ϑ;u,vtn− = Y
t,ϑ;u,v
tn −△M t,ϑ;u,vtn .
Taking into account that M t,ϑ;u,v is an F˜π-martingale, this yields
Y t,ϑ;u,vtn− =E[Y
t,ϑ;u,v
tn |F˜πtn−] and △M t,ϑ;u,vtn = Y t,ϑ;u,vtn −E[Y t,ϑ;u,vtn |F˜πtn−].
Having now Y t,ϑ;u,vtn− ∈ L2(Ω, F˜πtn−, P ), we can consider BSDE (2.3) over
the time interval [tn−1, tn) like a classical one, with dM
t,ϑ;u,v
s = 0, s ∈ [tn−1, tn).
By slving this BSDE over [tn−1, tn), we get, in particular, Y
t,ϑ;u,v
tn−1 . Iterating
this argument, we see that
Y t,ϑ;u,vtj− =E[Y
t,ϑ;u,v
tj
|F˜πtj−] and △M t,ϑ;u,vtj = Y
t,ϑ;u,v
tj
−E[Y t,ϑ;u,vtj |F˜πtj−],
for all tj > t, and M
t,ϑ;u,v is constant in the intervals [tj−1∨ t, tj), 1≤ j ≤ n.
Remark 2.2. In the classical case, where the running payoff function
f(s,x, y, z, u, v) does not depend on y and on z, the solution Y t,ϑ;u,v of
BSDE (2.3) takes the simple, well-known form
Y t,ϑ;u,vs =E
[
Φ(Xt,ϑ;u,vT ) +
∫ T
s
f(r,Xt,ϑ;u,vr , ur, vr)dr|F˜πs
]
,
s ∈ [t, T ], x ∈Rd.
From standard estimates for BSDEs of the type of equation (2.3) we get,
for all p ≥ 2, the existence of some constant Cp depending only p and on
the Lipschitz constants and the bounds of the coefficients, such that, for
all partitions π, all initial data t ∈ [0, T ], ϑ,ϑ′ ∈ L2(Ω,Fπt , P ;Rd) and all
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u ∈ Ut,T , v ∈ Vt,T it holds, P -a.s.,
(i) |Y t,ϑ;u,vs | ≤Cp, s ∈ [t, T ];
(ii) E
[(∫ T
t
|Zt,ϑ;u,vs |2 ds
)p/2∣∣∣F˜πt ]≤Cp;
(iii) E
[
sup
s∈[t,T ]
|Y t,ϑ;u,vs − Y t,ϑ
′;u,v
s |p(2.4)
+
(∫ T
t
|Zt,ϑ;u,vs −Zt,ϑ
′;u,v
s |2 ds
)p/2∣∣∣F˜πt ]
≤CpE[|ϑ− ϑ′|p|F˜πt ];
from where, in particular, for some constant C ∈R,
(i) |Y t,ϑ;u,vt | ≤C, P -a.s.;
(2.5)
(ii) |Y t,ϑ;u,vt − Y t,ϑ
′;u,v
t | ≤C(E[|ϑ− ϑ′|2|F˜πt ])1/2, P -a.s.
For a game, in which the both Players 1 and 2 play along a partition
π over a time interval [t, T ] and use the admissible controls u ∈ Uπt,T and
v ∈ Vπt,T , we consider the following pay-off functional:
Jπ(t, x;u, v) = Y t,x;u,vt , (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd, (u, v) ∈ Uπt,T ×Vπt,T .
However, if we want to study the stochastic differential game in a general
frame, we can not consider games of the type “control against control”, but
we shall study games with nonanticipative strategies with delay; for a more
detailed discussion the reader is referred to, for example, [1].
Let us introduce the notion of nonanticipative strategies with delay (NAD-
strategies). They differ from the definitions given in [2] and in [1] and follow
rather the spirit of the definition given in [4], but now extended to the
stochastic case.
Definition 2.2 (NAD-strategies along the partition π). Let π = {0 =
t0 < t1 < · · · < tn = T} (n ≥ 1) an arbitrary partition of the time interval
[0, T ] and t ∈ [0, T ]. We say that a mapping β :Uπt,T −→ Vπt,T is an NAD-
strategy for Player 2 for the game over the time interval [t, T ] along the
partition π, if:
(i) For all F˜π-stopping times τ :Ω→ π = {t0, t1, . . . , tn} it holds: When-
ever two controls u,u′ ∈ Uπt,T coincide dsdP -a.e. on the stochastic interval
[[t, τ ]], then also β(u)s = β(u
′)s, ds dP -a.e. on [[t, τ ]].
(ii) For all 0 ≤ j ≤ n − 1, it holds that, whenever two controls u,u′ ∈
Uπt,T coincide dsdP -a.e. on [t, tj]×Ω, then also β(u)s = β(u′)s, ds dP -a.e. on
[t, tj+1]×Ω.
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The set of all NAD-strategies for Player 2 over [t, T ] along the partition
π is denoted by Bπt,T .
In an obvious symmetric way we define for Player 1 his set Aπt,T of NAD-
strategies α :Vπt,T −→Uπt,T over the interval [t, T ] along the partition π.
Unlike the definitions in [2] and [1], the delays for which we have this
NAD-property (ii) in the above definition is not considered as arbitrarily
small for a given partition π, but they are defined by the partition π. But,
however, in what follows we will study our game as the mesh of the partition
π tends to zero.
The following result is crucial and it links our games defined through a
couple of admissible controls with those defined through NAD-strategies.
Lemma 2.1. Let π be any partition of the interval [0, T ] and t ∈ [0, T ].
Then, for all couples of NAD-strategies (α,β) ∈Aπt,T ×Bπt,T , there is a unique
couple of admissible controls (u, v) ∈ Uπt,T × Vπt,T such that α(v) = u and
β(u) = v, dsdP -a.e. on [t, T ]×Ω.
In the above cited references [1, 2] and [4] different definitions of NAD-
strategies were given, but the idea of the proof of the above lemma remains
similar. However, let us give it for the convenience of the reader.
Proof. Let π = {0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tn = T} be a partition of the in-
terval [0, T ], and (α,β) ∈ Aπt,T × Bπt,T . Let t ∈ [ti, ti+1). Then, due to our
definition of NAD strategies, α(v), β(u) restricted to [t, ti+1] depend only
on v ∈ Vπt,T and u ∈ Uπt,T restricted to the interval [t, ti]. But this interval is
empty or a singleton, so that α(v), β(u) restricted to the [t, ti+1] do not de-
pend on v and u, respectively. Thus, putting for arbitrary u0 ∈ Uπt,T , v0 ∈ Vπt,T ,
u1 := α(v0), v1 := β(u0), we get
α(v1) = u1, β(u1) = v1 dsdP -a.s. on [t, ti+1].
Let us suppose now that we have constructed, for j ≥ 2, (uj−1, vj−1) ∈
Uπt,T × VΠt,tl such that α(vj−1) = uj−1 and β(uj−1) = vj−1, dsdP -a.s. on
[t, ti+j−1]. Then we set u
j := α(vj−1), vj := β(uj−1), and, obviously, (uj, vj) ∈
Uπt,T ×Vπt,T is such that (uj , vj) = (uj−1, vj−1), dsdP -a.s. on [t, ti+j−1]. Thus,
because of the NAD property [see Definition 2.2(ii)] of α,β, uj = α(vj), vj =
β(uj), dsdP -a.s. on [t, ti+j ]. Consequently, iterating this argument we obtain
the existence of a couple (u, v) ∈ Uπt,T ×Vπt,T which satisfies the statement of
the lemma. Its uniqueness is an immediate consequence of the above con-
struction. 
Given a couple of NAD-strategies (α,β) ∈ Aπt,T × Bπt,T of the both play-
ers, the above lemma allows to define the corresponding dynamics and the
corresponding pay-off functional through those of the associated admissible
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control processes. More precisely, for (u, v) ∈ Uπt,T ×Vπt,T such that α(v) = u
and β(u) = v, dsdP -a.e. on [t, T ]×Ω, we define, for all ϑ ∈L2(Ω,Fπt , P ;Rd)
and x ∈Rd,
Xt,ϑ;α,β :=Xt,ϑ;u,v,
(Y t,ϑ;α,β,Zt,ϑ;α,β,M t,ϑ;α,β) := (Y t,ϑ;u,v,Zt,ϑ;u,v,M t,ϑ;u,v),
Jπ(t, x;α,β) := Jπ(t, x;u, v).
After the above preliminary discussion, we are now able to introduce the
upper and the lower value functions for the game over the time interval [t, T ]
along a partition π. We define the lower value function along a partition π as
W π(t, x) := ess sup
α∈Aπ
t,T
ess inf
β∈Bπ
t,T
Jπ(t, x;α,β)(2.6)
and the upper one as follows:
Uπ(t, x) := ess inf
β∈Bπ
t,T
ess sup
α∈Aπt,T
Jπ(t, x;α,β).(2.7)
Let us emphasize that the above lower and the upper value functions are
defined as a combination of essential supremum and essential infimum over
a bounded family of F˜πt -measurable random variables Jπ(t, x;α,β). Indeed,
due to (2.5)(i),
|Jπ(t, x;α,β)|= |Y t,ϑ;α,βt | ≤C, P -a.s., for all (α,β) ∈Aπt,T ×Bπt,T .
Consequently, with the definitions of the essential infimum and the essen-
tial supremum over families of random variables, given in [7] and [8] (see also
[13] for a more detailed discussion), the upper and the lower value functions
W π(t, x) and Uπ(t, x) are, a priori, themselves also bounded, F˜πt -measurable
random variables. But, combining arguments from [3] and [4], we will be able
to prove that they are deterministic. However, for this proof we will have
first to establish a dynamic programming principle.
Let us finish this section with the following estimates for the lower and
the upper value functions, which are an immediate consequence of the cor-
responding uniform estimates (2.5) for the solution of BSDE (2.3).
Lemma 2.2. Under our standard assumptions on the coefficients b, σ, f
and Φ there exists a constant L ∈R such that, for all partitions π of [0, T ]
and all t ∈ [0, T ], x, x′ ∈Rd,
(i) |W π(t, x)|+ |Uπ(t, x)| ≤L,
(ii) |W π(t, x)−W π(t, x′)|+ |Uπ(t, x)−Uπ(t, x′)| ≤L|x− x′|,(2.8)
P -a.s.
3. Lower and upper value functions along a partition. This section is
devoted to the study of properties of the lower and the upper value functions
W π and Uπ defined along a partition π of the interval [0, T ]. The main
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objectives in this section are to prove that both functions, characterized in
the preceding section as random fields, are in fact deterministic, and they
satisfy a dynamic programming principle along the partition π.
Theorem 3.1. For any partition π of the interval [0, T ] and for all
(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd, we have W π(t, x) = E[W π(t, x)],Uπ(t, x) = E[Uπ(t, x)],
P -a.s.
Remark 3.1. A consequence of this theorem is that, by identifying
W π(t, x) :=E[W π(t, x)],Uπ(t, x) :=E[Uπ(t, x)], (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd, the lower
and the upper value functions along a partition π W π and Uπ can be re-
garded as deterministic functions.
The proof of the above theorem is strongly inspired by that of Proposi-
tion 3.1 in [3] and uses heavily the structure of our underlying probability
space (Ω,F , P ). We only give the proof for W π(t, x), for some arbitrarily
fixed (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd. The proof for Uπ(t, x) is analogous and won’t be
given here.
Let the partition π of the interval [0, T ] be of the form π = {0 = t0 <
t1 < · · ·< tn = T} and let 1≤ j ≤ n be such that t ∈ [tj−1, tj). Recalling that
W π(t, x) is an F˜πt -measurable random variable, it follows from the definition
of the σ-field F˜πt that,W π(t, x) P -a.s. coincides with a measurable functional
W π(t, x)(ζ(j−1),B(t)) of ζ(j−1) = (ζ1, . . . , ζj−1) of the first j − 1 components
of the coordinate process ζ = (ζℓ)ℓ≥1 on Ω1 and the Brownian motion B
(t) =
(Bs)s∈[0,t] defined over Ω2 and restricted to the time interval [0, t].
Let Ht be the Cameron–Martin space of all absolutely continuous func-
tions h ∈ C([0, T ];Rd) which derivative h˙ is square integrable and satis-
fies h˙s = 0, ds-a.e. on [t, T ], and let us denote by Ω
(j−1)
1 the set of all se-
quences ρ = (ρℓ = (ρℓ,1, ρℓ,2))ℓ≥1 ∈ Ω1, such that ρℓ = 0, ℓ ≥ j. Given any
(a,h) ∈ Ω(j−1)1 ×Ht, we define the transformation τa,h :Ω→ Ω by putting
τa,h(ρ,ω
′) := (ρ+ a,ω′ + h)(= ((ρℓ + aℓ)ℓ≥1, ω
′ + h)), (ρ,ω′) ∈ Ω = Ω1 × Ω2.
Such defined transformation is bijective, τ−1a,h = τ−a,−h, (a,h) ∈Ω
(j−1)
1 ×Ht,
and its law P ◦ [τa,h]−1 is equivalent to P . Indeed, the law P ◦ [τa,h]−1 has
with respect to P the density
La,h = exp
{
〈a, ζ〉+
∫ t
0
h˙s dBs − 1
2
(
|a|2 +
∫ t
0
|h˙s|2 ds
)}
,
where
〈a, ζ〉 :=
∑
ℓ≥1
aℓζℓ =
j−1∑
ℓ=1
aℓζℓ
(
=
∑
1≤ℓ≤j−1,i=1,2
aℓ,iζℓ,i
)
and
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|a|2 =
∑
ℓ≥1
|aℓ|2 =
j−1∑
ℓ=1
|aℓ|2
(
=
∑
1≤ℓ≤j−1,i=1,2
|aℓ,i|2
)
,
a = (aℓ = (aℓ,1, aℓ,2))ℓ≥1 ∈ Ω(j−1)1 . We observe that the density La,h is F˜πt -
measurable and belongs to Lp(Ω,F , P ), for all p≥ 1.
The following lemma is essential for the proof thatW (t, x) is deterministic.
Lemma 3.1. Let ξ ∈ L0(Ω, F˜πt , P ) be a random variable which, for all
(a,h) ∈Ω(j−1)1 ×Ht, is invariant with respect to all transformations τa,h :Ω→
Ω, that is, ξ ◦ τa,h = ξ, P -a.s. Then, there exists some deterministic real
number c ∈R, such that ξ = c,P -a.s.
Proof. Let ξ ∈ L0(Ω, F˜πt , P ) be invariant with respect to all transfor-
mations τa,h :Ω→ Ω, (a,h) ∈Ω(j−1)1 ×Ht. Then, for all (a,h) ∈Ω(j−1)1 ×Ht
and all bounded Borel functions g :R→R,
E[g(ξ)]
=E[g(ξ ◦ τa,h)](3.1)
=E
[
g(ξ) exp
{
〈a, ζ〉+
∫ t
0
h˙s dBs
}]
· exp
{
−1
2
(
|a|2 +
∫ t
0
|h˙s|2 ds
)}
,
that is,
E
[
g(ξ) exp
{
j−1∑
ℓ=1
aℓζℓ +
∫ t
0
h˙s dBs
}]
=E[g(ξ)] · exp
{
1
2
(
|a|2 +
∫ t
0
|h˙s|2 ds
)}
(3.2)
=E[g(ξ)] ·E
[
exp
{
j−1∑
ℓ=1
aℓζℓ +
∫ t
0
h˙s dBs
}]
for all aℓ ∈R2,1≤ ℓ≤ j − 1, and all h ∈Ht, from where we deduce that ξ is
independent of (ζ(j−1) = (ζ1, . . . , ζj−1),B
(t) = (Bs)s∈[0,t]) and, hence also of
F˜πt = σ{ζ(j−1),B(t)}. But this means that ξ as an F˜πt -measurable random
variable is independent of itself. The statement of the lemma follows now
easily. 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. In order to be able to conclude our theorem
form the above lemma, we only have to show that the random variable
W π(t, x) is invariant with respect to the transformations τa,h :Ω→Ω, for all
(a,h) ∈Ω(j−1)1 ×Ht. For showing this, we fix arbitrarily (a,h) ∈Ω(j−1)1 ×Ht
and we proceed in an analogous spirit as that in the proof of Proposition
3.1 in [3]. But, however, the framework is different here.
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Step 1. Given a couple of admissible controls (u, v) ∈ Uπt,T ×Vπt,T , we notice
that also the transformed couple (u ◦ τa,h, v ◦ τa,h) belongs to Uπt,T × Vπt,T .
Indeed, having t ∈ [tj−1, tj),
us = uj(s, (ζ1, . . . , ζj−1, ζj,1,B·∧s))I[t,tj)(s)
+
n∑
ℓ=j+1
uℓ(s, (ζ1, . . . , ζℓ−1, ζℓ,1,B·∧s))I[tℓ−1,tℓ)(s) dsdP -a.e.,
for measurable functionals uℓ,1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n, the transformed control process
u ◦ τa,h takes the form
us ◦ τa,h
= uj(s, (ζ1+ a1, . . . , ζj−1+ aj−1, ζj,1,B·∧s + h·∧t))I[t,tj)(s)
(3.3)
+
n∑
ℓ=j+1
uℓ(s, (ζ1 + a1, . . . , ζj−1+ aj−1, ζj, . . . , ζℓ−1, ζℓ,1,
B·∧s + h·∧t))I[tℓ−1,tℓ)(s),
ds dP -a.e., from where we see that also u ◦ τa,h is an admissible control for
Player 1; the symmetric argument shows that v ◦ τa,h ∈ Vπt,T . Applying now
the transformation to the forward equation (2.1) and taking into account
that the increments of the Brownian motion after t are not changed by
the transformation: (Bs −Bt) ◦ τa,h =Bs −Bt, s ∈ [t, T ] (Indeed, recall that
h˙s = 0, ds-a.e. on [t, T ]), we obtain from the uniqueness of the solution of
SDE (2.1) that Xt,x;u,vs ◦ τa,h =Xt,x;u(τa,h),v(τa,h)s , s ∈ [t, T ], P -a.s. Let us now
apply the transformation τa,h to BSDE (2.3). With the argument already
used for its application to the forward SDE we see that BSDE (2.3) becomes
dY t,x;u,vs ◦ τa,h
=−E[f(s,Xt,x;u(τa,h),v(τa,h)s , Y t,x;u,vs ◦ τa,h,Zt,x;u,vs ◦ τa,h,
us(τa,h), vs(τa,h))|F˜πs ]ds(3.4)
+Zt,x;u,vs ◦ τa,h dBs + dM t,x;u,vs ◦ τa,h,
Y t,x;u,vT ◦ τa,h =E[Φ(X
t,x;u(τa,h),v(τa,h)
T )|F˜πT ].
We remark that (i) (Y t,x;u,v ◦ τa,h,Zt,x;u,v ◦ τa,h) ∈ S2F˜π(t, T ;R) × L
2
F˜π
(t,
T ;Rd). Indeed, the F˜π-adaptedness of the transformed process can be proved
directly, and the square integrability follows from standard Lp-estimates for
the solutions of BSDEs:
E
[
sup
s∈[t,T ]
|Y t,x;u,vs ◦ τa,h|2 +
∫ T
t
|Zt,x;u,vs ◦ τa,h|2 ds
]
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=E
[(
sup
s∈[t,T ]
|Y t,x;u,vs |2 +
∫ T
t
|Zt,x;u,vs |2 ds
)
La,h
]
≤C(E[L2a,h])1/2
(
E
[
sup
s∈[t,T ]
|Y t,x;u,vs |4 +
(∫ T
t
|Zt,x;u,vs |2 ds
)2])1/2
<+∞.
On the other hand, the fact La,h ∈ L2(Ω, F˜πt , P ) has as consequence that
also the transformed (F˜π, P )-martingaleM t,x;u,v◦τa,h = (M t,x;u,vs ◦τa,h)s∈[t,T ]
is again an (F˜π, P )-martingale. Indeed, for t≤ s≤ T and ξ ∈ L∞(Ω, F˜πs , P ),
also ξ ◦ τ−a,−h ∈L∞(Ω, F˜πs , P ), and
E[(M t,x;u,vT −M t,x;u,vs ) ◦ τa,h · ξ]
=E[(M t,x;u,vT −M t,x;u,vs ) · ξ ◦ τ−a,−h ·La,h](3.5)
=E[E[M t,x;u,vT −M t,x;u,vs |F˜πs ] · ξ ◦ τ−a,−hLa,h] = 0.
Consequently,M t,x;u,v ◦τa,h is an (F˜π, P )-martingale; its square integrabil-
ity follows from an argument similar to that for (Y t,x;u,v ◦τa,h,Zt,x;u,v ◦τa,h),
(recall the explicit representation of M t,x;u,v in terms of Y t,x;u,v, which im-
plies the Lp-integrability of M t,x;u,v for all p ≥ 1.) and its orthogonality to
B stems from the fact that it is a pure jump martingale.
This shows that (Y t,x;u,v ◦ τa,h,Zt,x;u,v ◦ τa,h,M t,x;u,v ◦ τa,h) is a solution
of BSDE (2.3) with the couple of admissible controls (u(τa,h), v(τa,h)). From
the uniqueness of the solution of this BSDE it then follows that
(Y t,x;u,v ◦ τa,h,Zt,x;u,v ◦ τa,h,M t,x;u,v ◦ τa,h)
(3.6)
= (Y t,x;u(τa,h),v(τa,h),Zt,x;u(τa,h),v(τa,h),M t,x;u(τa,h),v(τa,h)),
and, in particular, it follows that
Jπ(t, x;u, v) ◦ τa,h = Jπ(t, x;u(τa,h), v(τa,h)), P -a.s.
Step 2. Let us translate in this step the result of step 1 to couples of NAD
strategies. For β ∈ Bπt,T we define βa,h(u) := β(u(τ−a,−h))(τa,h), u ∈ Uπt,T . For
such defined mapping βa,h :Uπt,T → Vπt,T it can be verified in a straight-
forward manner that it belongs to Bπt,T . We also observe that (β−a,−h)a,h = β.
A symmetric definition allows to introduce αa,h ∈Aπt,T , for α ∈Aπt,T and to
get (α−a,−h)a,h = α.
Given a couple of NAD-strategies (α,β) ∈ Aπt,T × Bπt,T , let us denote by
(u, v) ∈ Uπt,T ×Vπt,T the couple of admissible controls associated with through
Lemma 2.1. Then
αa,h(v(τa,h)) = α(v)(τa,h) = u(τa,h) and
βa,h(u(τa,h)) = β(u)(τa,h) = v(τa,h).
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Consequently, the couple (u(τa,h), v(τa,h)) ∈ Uπt,T × Vπt,T is associated with
(αa,h, βa,h) through Lemma 2.1, and from step 1 we get
Jπ(t, x;α,β) ◦ τa,h = Jπ(t, x;u, v) ◦ τa,h = Jπ(t, x;u(τa,h), v(τa,h))
(3.7)
= Jπ(t, x;αa,h, βa,h), P -a.s.
Step 3. Using the definition of the esssup and the essinf over a family of
random variables as well as the fact that the transformation τa,h is invertible
and its law P ◦ [τa,h]−1 is equivalent to P , we show that
W π(t, x) ◦ τa,h
= (ess sup
α∈Aπ
t,T
ess inf
β∈Bπ
t,T
Jπ(t, x;α,β)) ◦ τa,h(3.8)
= ess sup
α∈Aπ
t,T
ess inf
β∈Bπ
t,T
(Jπ(t, x;α,β) ◦ τa,h), P -a.s.
Consequently, by combining the results of the previous steps and by con-
sidering that, thanks to step 2, {αa,h, α ∈Aπt,T }=Aπt,T and {βa,h, β ∈ Bπt,T }=
Bπt,T , we obtain
W π(t, x) ◦ τa,h = ess sup
α∈Aπ
t,T
ess inf
β∈Bπ
t,T
(Jπ(t, x;α,β) ◦ τa,h)
= ess sup
α∈Aπ
t,T
ess inf
β∈Bπ
t,T
Jπ(t, x;αa,h, βa,h)(3.9)
=W π(t, x), P -a.s.
By combining this result with Lemma 3.1, we complete the proof. 
As an immediate consequence of Lemma 2.2 and the above result that
the lower and the upper value functions along a partition are deterministic,
we have the following result.
Lemma 3.2. There exists a constant L ∈ R which does not depend on
the partition π of the interval [0, T ], such that, for all t ∈ [0, T ], x,x′ ∈Rd,
(i) |W π(t, x)|+ |Uπ(t, x)| ≤ L,
(3.10)
(ii) |W π(t, x)−W π(t, x′)|+ |Uπ(t, x)−Uπ(t, x′)| ≤ L|x− x′|.
After having proved that the lower and the upper value functions along a
partition π are deterministic, our objective is now to show that, with respect
to the points of the partition they satisfy the DPP. A key role will be played
here by the notion of backward stochastic semigroup, introduced by Peng
in [18].
Given a partition π = {0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tn = T} of the interval [0, T ],
initial data (t, x) ∈ [0, T )×Rd, a positive δ < T − t and a couple of admissible
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control processes (u, v) ∈ Uπt,t+δ × Vπt,t+δ as well as a random variable η ∈
L2(Ω,Fπt+δ, P ), we define the backward stochastic semigroup
Gt,x;u,vs,t+δ (η) := Y
u,v
s , s ∈ [t, t+ δ],
through the BSDE with time horizon t+ δ,
dY
u,v
s =−E[f(s,Xt,ϑ;u,vs , Y u,vs ,Zu,vs , us, vs)|F˜πs ]ds
+Z
u,v
s dBs + dM
u,v
s ,
Y
u,v
T =E[η|F˜πt+δ ],
(3.11)
and its unique solution (Y
u,v
,Z
u,v
,M
u,v
) ∈ S2
F˜π
(t, t+δ;R)×L2
F˜π
(t, t+δ;Rd)×
M2
F˜π
(t, t+ δ;R) with [B,M
u,v
]s = 0, s ∈ [t, T ] and Mu,vt = 0, where Xt,ϑ;u,v
is the solution of SDE (2.1).
From the discussion made in the frame of Remark 2.1 it becomes clear
that if, for some point tj of the partition π = {0 = t0 < t1 < · · ·< tn = T},
tj−1 ≤ t < t+ δ = tj and η is F˜πtj−-measurable, then M
u,v
s = 0, s ∈ [t, tj].
The properties of the backward stochastic semigroup follow directly from
those of the BSDE through which it is defined, so that we won’t discuss
separately here (refer to [18], or [3]). The notion of backward stochastic
semigroup now allows to study the DPP along a partition π of the time
interval [0, T ].
Theorem 3.2. Let π = {0 = t0 < t1 < · · ·< tn = T} be a partition of the
interval [0, T ], and let t ∈ [ti, ti+1) and x ∈ Rd. Then, for all i+ 1≤ j ≤ n,
P -a.s.,
W π(t, x) = ess sup
α∈Aπt,tj
ess inf
β∈Bπt,tj
Gt,x;α,βt,tj (W
π(tj ,X
t,x;α,β
tj
)),
(3.12)
Uπ(t, x) = ess inf
β∈Bπt,tj
ess sup
α∈Aπt,tj
Gt,x;α,βt,tj (U
π(tj,X
t,x;α,β
tj
)).
Remark 3.2. The space Uπt,tj of admissible controls for Player 1 for
games over the time interval [t, tj ] along the partition π is defined as the
set of all control processes u ∈ Uπt,T restricted to the time interval [t, tj ];
the space Vπt,tj of admissible controls for Player 2 is defined analogously.
The NAD-strategies for Player 2, β ∈ Bπt,tj :Uπt,tj →Vπt,tj , are defined in the
same manner as the NAD-strategies in Bπt,T , with the only difference that
we consider tj instead T = tn as terminal horizon. The same is done in the
definition of the set Aπt,tj of NAD-strategies for Player 1.
The proof split into two lemmas for the lower value function along the
partition π; it is similar for the upper value function along the partition
π. Let us fix arbitrarily a partition π = {0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tn = T} of the
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interval [0, T ], and let t ∈ [ti, ti+1), i+1≤ j ≤ n and x ∈Rd. We put
W˜ πtj (t, x) = ess sup
α∈Aπt,tj
ess inf
β∈Bπt,tj
Gt,x;α,βt,tj (W
π(tj,X
t,x;α,β
tj
)).
Obviously, W˜ πtj (t, x) is a bounded, F˜πt -measurable random variable.
Lemma 3.3. Under the standard assumptions, we have made on the
coefficients it holds that W˜ πtj (t, x)≤W π(t, x), P -a.s.
Proof. Step 1. Let us fix an arbitrary ε > 0. Then, we can find αε1 ∈Aπt,tj
such that
W˜ πtj (t, x)≤ ess infβ∈Bπt,tj
G
t,x;αε1,β
t,tj
(W π(tj,X
t,x;αε1,β
tj
)) + ε, P -a.s.
In order to verify this latter relation, we put
I(α) := ess inf
β∈Bπt,tj
Gt,x;α,βt,tj (W
π(tj,X
t,x;α,β
tj
)), α ∈Aπt,tj ,
and we note that, due to the properties of the essential supremum over a
family of random variables, there is some sequence (αk)k≥1 ⊂Aπt,tj such that
W˜ πtj (t, x) = ess sup
α∈Aπt,tj
I(α) = sup
k≥1
I(αk), P -a.s.
Thus, putting △k := {W˜ πtj (t, x)≤ I(αk) + ε, W˜ πtj (t, x)> I(αℓ) + ε(1 ≤ ℓ≤
k− 1)} ∈ F˜πt , k ≥ 1, we define a partition of Ω, and putting
αε1(·) :=
∑
k≥1
I△kα
k(·) :Vπt,tj →Uπt,tj ,
we check easily that αε1 is an NAD-strategy in Aπt,tj and that W˜ πtj (t, x) ≤∑
k≥1 I△kI(α
k) + ε ≤∑k≥1 I△kGt,x;αk,β1t,tj (W π(tj ,Xt,x;αk,β1tj )) + ε, P-a.s., for
all β1 ∈ Bπt,tj . Given an arbitrary β1 ∈ Bπt,tj , we let (uk, vk) ∈ Uπt,tj × Vπt,tj be
such that αk(vk) = uk, β1(u
k) = vk, ds dP -a.e. on [t, tj]×Ω, and we introduce
(u1, v1) :=
∑
k≥1 I△k(u
k, vk) ∈ Uπt,tj × Vπt,tj . Then, since for the F˜π-stopping
time τk = tjI△k+tI△ck the processes u1 and u
k coincide, dsdP -a.e. on [[t, τk]],
also β1(u
k) = β1(u1), dsdP -a.e. on [[t, τk]]. Thus,
β1(u1) =
∑
k≥1
I△kβ1(u
k) =
∑
k≥1
I△kv
k = v1, ds dP -a.e. on[t, tj]×Ω,
and with a symmetric argument we also have
αε1(v1) =
∑
k≥1
I△kα
k(v1) =
∑
k≥1
I△kα
k(vk) = u1, ds dP -a.e. on [t, tj]×Ω.
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This shows that the couple (u1, v1) ∈ Uπt,tj ×Vπt,tj is associated with (αε1, β1) ∈Aπt,tj×Bπt,tj by Lemma 2.1. Consequently, from the uniqueness of the solution
of SDE (2.1) we conclude with a standard argument that∑
k≥1
I△kX
t,x;αk,β1 =
∑
k≥1
I△kX
t,x;uk,vk =Xt,x;u1,v1 =Xt,x;α
ε
1,β1
on [t, tj], P -a.s.
Similarly, using now the uniqueness of the solution of BSDE defining the
backward stochastic semigroup, we show that∑
k≥1
I△k(Y˜
t,x;αk,β1 , Z˜t,x;α
k,β1 , M˜ t,x;α
k,β1) = (Y˜ t,x;α
ε
1,β1 , Z˜t,x;α
ε
1,β1 , M˜ t,x;α
ε
1,β1),
and recalling the definition of the backward stochastic semigroup, we see
that∑
k≥1
I△kG
t,x;αk,β1
t,tj
(W π(tj,X
t,x;αk,β1
tj
)) =G
t,x;αε1,β1
t,tj
(W π(tj ,X
t,x;αε1,β1
tj
)).
Consequently, for all β1 ∈ Bπt,tj ,
W˜ πtj (t, x)≤
∑
k≥1
I△kI(α
k) + ε
≤
∑
k≥1
I△kG
t,x;αk,β1
t,tj
(W π(tj,X
t,x;αk ,β1
tj
)) + ε(3.13)
=G
t,x;αε1,β1
t,tj
(W π(tj,X
t,x;αε1,β1
tj
)) + ε, P -a.s.
Let us make now a special choice of β1 ∈ Bπt,tj . Given an arbitrary β ∈Bπt,T and any u2 ∈ Uπtj ,T , we define for any u1 ∈ Uπt,tj the process u1 ⊕ u2 :=
u1I[t,tj ] + u2I(tj ,T ] ∈ Uπt,T , and we put
β1(u1) := β(u1 ⊕ u2)|[t,tj ], u1 ∈ Uπt,tj ,
the restriction of β(u1⊕u2) to the time interval [t, tj]. It can be easily verified
that such defined mapping β1 :Uπt,tj → Vπt,tj belongs to Bπt,tj , and thanks to
its nonanticipativity property it does not depend on the special choice of u2.
Let us denote by (uε1, v
ε
1) ∈ Uπt,tj ×Vπt,tj the unique couple of control processes
associated with (αε1, β1) through Lemma 2.1.
Step 2. After having proven in step 1 that
W˜ πtj (t, x)≤G
t,x;αε1,β1
t,tj
(W π(tj,X
t,x;αε1,β1
tj
)) + ε, P -a.s.,
let us now estimate the expression W π(tj,X
t,x;αε1,β1
tj
) to which the backward
stochastic semigroup is applied at the right-hand side of the above esti-
mate. For this we consider a Borel partition Ok, k ≥ 1, of Rd, consisting of
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nonempty Borel sets Ok with diameter less or equal to ε, and we fix arbi-
trarily in each of this sets Ok an element xk. With the arguments already
developed in step 1 we show that, for every k ≥ 1, there is some αk2 ∈Aπtj ,T
such that
W π(tj , xk) = ess sup
α2∈Aπtj,T
ess inf
β2∈Bπtj,T
Jπ(tj , xk;α2, β2)
≤ ess inf
β2∈Bπtj,T
Jπ(tj, xk;α
k
2 , β2) + ε, P -a.s.,
and putting αε2(·) :=
∑
k≥1 I{X
t,x;αε1,β1
tj
∈ Ok}αk2(·) :Vπtj ,T →Uπtj ,T we obtain
an NAD-strategy from Aπtj ,T . Indeed, the sets {X
t,x;αε1,β1
tj
∈Ok}, k ≥ 1, form-
ing a partition of Ω, belong to
Fπtj− =FBtj ∨Hj = F˜πtj .
(We remark that the relation Fπs− = F˜πs only holds for points of the partition
π; this is also the reason, why we do not have a DPP which does not use
the points of the partition π). Thus, by combining the arguments developed
in step 1 with the Lipschitz property of W π(tj, ·) and Jπ(tj , ·;α,β) we can
show that, for all β2 ∈ Bπtj ,T ,
W π(tj ,X
t,x;αε1,β1
tj
)
≤
∑
k≥1
I{Xt,x;αε1,β1tj ∈Ok}W π(tj, xk) +Lε
≤
∑
k≥1
I{Xt,x;αε1,β1tj ∈Ok}Jπ(tj, xk;αk2 , β2) + (L+1)ε(3.14)
≤
∑
k≥1
I{Xt,x;αε1,β1tj ∈Ok}Jπ(tj,X
t,x;αε1,β1
tj
;αk2 , β2) + (2L+ 1)ε
= Jπ(tj,X
t,x;αε1,β1
tj
;αε2, β2) + (2L+ 1)ε, P -a.s.
For our arbitrarily chosen β ∈ Bπt,T we put βε2(u2) := β(uε1⊕u2)|[tj ,T ] ∈ Vπtj ,T ,
u2 ∈ Uπtj ,T . Obviously, βε2 ∈ Bπtj ,T . Let us denote by (uε2, vε2) ∈ Uπtj ,T ×Vπtj ,T the
unique couple of control processes associated with (αε2, β
ε
2) through Lemma
2.1. Then, defining αε ∈Aπt,T by setting
αε(v) := αε1(v|[t,tj ])⊕αε2(v|(tj ,T ]), v ∈ Vπt,T ,
we see that, for (uε, vε) := (uε1 ⊕ uε2, vε1 ⊕ vε2) ∈ Uπt,T ×Vπt,T ,
αε(vε) = αε1(v
ε
1)⊕ αε2(vε2) = uε1 ⊕ uε2 = uε,
βε(uε) = βε(uε1 ⊕ uε2) = β1(uε1)⊕ βε2(uε2) = vε1 ⊕ vε2 = vε.
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Consequently, with the choice β2 = β
ε
2 , we have
W π(tj,X
t,x;αε1,β1
tj
)≤ Jπ(tj,Xt,x;α
ε
1,β1
tj
;αε2, β
ε
2) + (2L+1)ε
= Jπ(tj,X
t,x;uε1,v
ε
1
tj
;uε2, v
ε
2) + (2L+1)ε
= Y
tj ,X
t,x;uε1,v
ε
1
tj
;uε2,v
ε
2
tj
+ (2L+ 1)ε(3.15)
= Y
tj ,X
t,x;uε,vε
tj
;uε,vε
tj
+ (2L+1)ε
= Y t,x;u
ε,vε
tj
+ (2L+ 1)ε, P -a.s.
Indeed, the fact that X
t,x;uε1,v
ε
1
tj
is Fπtj− = F˜πtj -measurable, allows to substitute
this random variable at the place of x′ in the BSDE for (Y
tj ,x′;uε1,v
ε
1
s ,Z
tj ,x′;uε1,v
ε
1
s ,
M
tj ,x′;uε1,v
ε
1
s )s∈[tj ,T ]. The uniqueness of the solution of the resulting BSDE
then yields Y
tj ,X
t,x;uε,vε ;uε,vε
s = Y
t,x;uε,vε
s , s ∈ [tj, T ].
Combining the above result with that of step 1, and taking into account
the monotonicity and the Lipschitz properties of the backward stochastic
semigroup, which are a direct consequence of the corresponding properties
of the solutions of BSDEs (the proof of them is similar to the classical case
(e.g., refer to Peng [18]), also refer to [5]) we obtain
W˜ πtj (t, x)≤G
t,x;αε1,β1
t,tj
(W π(tj,X
t,x;αε1,β1
tj
)) + ε
≤Gt,x;αε1,β1t,tj (Y
t,x;uε,vε
tj
+ (2L+1)ε) + ε
≤Gt,x;uε1,vε1t,tj (Y
t,x;uε,vε
tj
) +Cε
(3.16)
=Gt,x;u
ε,vε
t,tj
(Y t,x;u
ε,vε
tj
) +Cε
= Y t,x;u
ε,vε
t +Cε
= Jπ(t, x;αε, β) +Cε, P -a.s., for all β ∈ Bπt,T .
Therefore,
W˜ πtj (t, x)≤ ess sup
α∈Aπ
t,T
ess inf
β∈Bπ
t,T
Jπ(t, x;α,β) +Cε
(3.17)
=W π(t, x) +Cε, P -a.s.,
and considering the arbitrariness of the choice of ε > 0 we can conclude the
proof. 
In order to complete the proof of the DPP, we need still the following
lemma.
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Lemma 3.4. Under our standard assumptions it holds that W˜ πtj (t, x)≥
W π(t, x), P -a.s.
Proof. The proof of this lemma uses mainly arguments which have
been already developed in the frame of the proof of the preceding lemma.
For this reason, we give here rather a sketch than a detailed proof.
Let us begin with fixing an arbitrary α ∈ Aπt,T . Given any v2 ∈ Vπtj ,T we
define α1 ∈ Aπt,tj by setting α1(v1) := α(v1 ⊕ v2)|[t,tj ] ∈ Uπt,tj , for v1 ∈ Vπt,tj .
Thanks to the nonanticipativity property of the elements of Aπt,tj , α1 does
not depend on the particular choice of v2. From the definition of W˜
π
tj (t, x),
it follows that
W˜ πtj (t, x)≥ ess infβ1∈Bπt,tj
Gt,x;α1,β1t,tj (W
π(tj ,X
t,x;α1,β1
tj
)),
P -a.s., for all α1 ∈Aπt,tj , and from the argument developed in step 1 of the
proof of Lemma 3.3 we know that, for an arbitrarily given ε > 0 there exists
βε1 ∈ Bπt,tj (depending on α1 ∈Aπt,tj ) such that
W˜ πtj (t, x)≥G
t,x;α1,βε1
t,tj
(W π(tj,X
t,x;α1,βε1
tj
))− ε, P -a.s.
In analogy to step 2 of the proof of Lemma 3.3, we estimate the expression
W π(tj ,X
t,x;α1,βε1
tj
) to which the backward stochastic semigroup is applied in
the above estimate. For this, we let (uε1, v
ε
1) ∈ Uπt,tj × Vπt,tj be the unique
control couple associated with (α1, β
ε
1) through Lemma 2.1, and we define
αε2(v2) := α(v
ε
1 ⊕ v2)[tj ,T ], v2 ∈ Vπtj ,T . Such defined mapping αε2 :Vπtj ,T →Uπtj ,T
belongs to Aπtj ,T , and using an adaptation of the argument with the Borel
partition Ok, k ≥ 1, of Rd, from step 2 of the proof of Lemma 3.3, which
leads to (3.14), we construct an NAD-strategy βε2 ∈ Bπtj ,T such that
W π(tj,X
t,x;α1,βε1
tj
)≥ ess inf
β2∈Bπtj ,T
Jπ(tj ,X
t,x;α1,βε1
tj
;αε2, β2)
(3.18)
≥ Jπ(tj ,Xt,x;α1,β
ε
1
tj
;αε2, β
ε
2)− ε, P -a.s.
Letting (uε2, v
ε
2) ∈ Uπtj ,T ×Vπtj ,T be the unique control couple associated with
(αε2, β
ε
2) through Lemma 2.1, we observe that, for β
ε ∈ Bπt,T defined by the
relation βε(u) := βε1(u|[t,tj ])⊕βε2(u|(tj ,T ]), u ∈ Uπt,T , we have the couple of con-
trols uε := uε1⊕uε2 ∈ Uπt,T , vε := vε1⊕vε2 ∈ Vπt,T associated with (α,βε) through
Lemma 2.1:
α(vε) = α(vε1 ⊕ vε2) = α1(vε1)⊕ αε2(vε2) = uε1 ⊕ uε2 = uε,
βε(uε) = βε1(u
ε
1)⊕ βε2(uε2) = vε1 ⊕ vε2 = vε.
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Consequently, thanks to the monotonicity and Lipschitz properties of the
backward stochastic semigroup, we have
W˜ πtj (t, x)≥G
t,x;α1,βε1
t,tj
(W π(tj ,X
t,x;α1,βε1
tj
))− ε
≥Gt,x;α1,βε1t,tj (Jπ(tj,X
t,x;α1,βε1
tj
;αε2, β
ε
2)− ε)− ε(3.19)
≥Gt,x;uε1,vε1t,tj (Y
tj ,X
t,x;uε1,v
ε
1
tj
;uε2,v
ε
2
tj
)−Cε
=Gt,x;u
ε,vε
t,tj
(Y
tj ,X
t,x;uε,vε
tj
;uε,vε
tj
)−Cε
=Gt,x;u
ε,vε
t,tj
(Y t,x;u
ε,vε
tj
)−Cε
= Y t,x;u
ε,vε
t −Cε
= Y t,x;α,β
ε
t −Cε, P -a.s.
We take in the latter estimate first the essential infimum over β ∈ Bπt,T ,
and then the essential supremum over all α ∈Aπt,T . Thus, by considering the
arbitrariness of ε > 0, we get the statement of the lemma. 
As a consequence of the proof of the DPP, we get the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 3.1. Under our standard assumptions, for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×
Rd, it holds
W π(t, x) = sup
α∈Aπ
t,T
inf
β∈Bπ
t,T
E[Jπ(t, x;α,β)],
(3.20)
Uπ(t, x) = inf
β∈Bπ
t,T
sup
α∈Aπ
t,T
E[Jπ(t, x;α,β)].
By combining the above lemma with Remark 2.2, we get the following
result under the classical assumption of a running payoff function not de-
pending on (y, z):
Corollary 3.1. Let us suppose in addition to our standard assump-
tions that the coefficient f(s,x, y, z, u, v) does not depend on (y, z). Then,
for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd,
W π(t, x) = sup
α∈Aπ
t,T
inf
β∈Bπ
t,T
E
[
Φ(Xt,x;u,vT )
+
∫ T
t
f(s,Xt,x;u,vs , us, vs)ds
]
,
(3.21)
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Uπ(t, x) = inf
β∈Bπ
t,T
sup
α∈Aπ
t,T
E
[
Φ(Xt,x;u,vT )
+
∫ T
t
f(s,Xt,x;u,vs , us, vs)ds
]
.
Now we prove the above Proposition 3.1.
Proof. Let (t, x) ∈ [0, T )×Rd, and tj ∈ π be such that tj ≤ t < tj+1. As
we have shown in the proof of the DPP that W˜ πtj (t, x) andW
π(t, x) coincide,
we see from (3.16) that, for every ε > 0, there exists αε ∈Aπt,T such that, for
all β ∈ Bπt,T ,
W π(t, x)≤ Jπ(t, x;αε, β) + ε, P -a.s.
Consequently, taking into account that W π(t, x) is deterministic, we get
W π(t, x)≤E[Jπ(t, x;αε, β)]+ε. By taking first the infimum over all β ∈ Bπt,T
and after the supremum over α ∈Aπt,T , we obtain
W π(t, x)≤ sup
α∈Aπ
t,T
inf
β∈Bπ
t,T
E[Jπ(t, x;α,β)].
To get the converse relation, we observe that, due to (3.19), for every ε > 0
and all α ∈Aπt,T , there exists some βε ∈ Bπt,T such that
W π(t, x)≥ Jπ(t, x;α,βε)− ε, P -a.s.
By taking the expectation on both sides of this inequality, after the infimum
with respect to βε ∈ Bπt,T and, at the end, the supremum over α ∈ Aπt,T , we
obtain that
W π(t, x)≥ sup
α∈Aπ
t,T
inf
β∈Bπ
t,T
E[Jπ(t, x;α,β)].
This proves the statement for W π(t, x); that for Uπ(t, x) can be proved
similarly. 
At the end of this section, let us still consider the Ho¨lder continuity of
the lower and the upper value functions along the partition with respect to
the time.
Proposition 3.2. Under our standard assumptions there exists a con-
stant C which is independent of the underlying partition π of the interval
[0, T ], such that
|W π(t, x)−W π(s,x)|+ |Uπ(t, x)−Uπ(s,x)| ≤C|t− s|1/2,
(3.22)
s, t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈Rd.
Proof. We restrict ourselves to the proof for W π; that for Uπ is anal-
ogous.
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Step 1. Given a partition π of the interval [0, T ], let us suppose that
0 ≤ t < s ≤ T and fix arbitrarily ε > 0. From the proof of Proposition 3.1,
we know that there exists αε ∈Aπt,T such that, for all β ∈ Bπt,T ,
W π(t, x)≤E[Jπ(t, x;αε, β)] + ε.(3.23)
For any fixed v0 ∈ V we let v01 := v0I[t,s). Then, for v2 ∈ Vπs,T , v01 ⊕ v2 :=
v0I[t,s) + v2I[s,T ] ∈ Vπt,T , and α˜ε(v2) := αε(v01 ⊕ v2)|[s,T ] ∈ Uπs,T . Moreover, it
can be easily checked that such defined mapping α˜ε belongs to Aπs,T . Again
from the proof of Proposition 3.1, it follows that there is β˜ε ∈ Bπs,T such that
W π(s,x)≥E[Jπ(s,x; α˜ε, β˜ε)]− ε.(3.24)
Let (uε2, v
ε
2) ∈ Uπs,T ×Vπs,T be associated with (α˜ε, β˜ε) through Lemma 2.1:
α˜ε(vε2) = u
ε
2, β˜
ε(uε2) = v
ε
2, dsdP -a.e. on [s,T ]×Ω.
On the other hand, let us define βε(u) := v01 ⊕ β˜ε(u|[s,T ]), u ∈ Uπt,T . Obvi-
ously, βε ∈ Bπt,T . Putting uε := αε(v01 ⊕ vε2) ∈ Uπt,T , we deduce from the fact
uε|[s,T ] = α
ε(v01 ⊕ vε2)|[s,T ] = α˜ε(vε2) = uε2, that (uε, vε := v01 ⊕ vε2) ∈ Uπt,T × Vπt,T
satisfies
αε(vε) = uε and
(3.25)
βε(uε) = v01 ⊕ β˜ε(uε2) = v01 ⊕ vε2 = vε,
over the interval [t, T ], while over the smaller interval [s,T ] it holds
α˜ε(vε|[s,T ]) = α˜
ε(vε2) = u
ε
2 = u
ε
|[s,T ] and
(3.26)
β˜ε(uε|[s,T ]) = β˜
ε(uε2) = v
ε
2 = v
ε
|[s,T ].
Consequently, from the relation (3.23) and (3.24) it follows that
W π(t, x)≤ E[Jπ(t, x;uε, vε)] + ε,
(3.27)
W π(s,x)≥ E[Jπ(s,x;uε, vε)]− ε,
from where
W π(t, x)−W π(s,x)
≤E[Jπ(t, x;uε, vε)− Jπ(s,x;uε, vε)] + 2ε(3.28)
≤E[|Y t,x;uε,vεs − Y s,x;u
ε,vε
s |] + |E[Y t,x;u
ε,vε
t − Y t,x;u
ε,vε
s ]|+ 2ε.
We emphasize that, if s /∈ π, unlike the classical Markovian case we do not
have here that Y t,x;u
ε,vε
s = Y
s,Xt,x;u
ε,vε
s ;u
ε,vε
s = Jπ(s,X
t,x;uε,vε
s ;uε, vε). Indeed,
here, if s ∈ (tj−1, tj), then Xt,x;u
ε,vε
s is Fπs−-measurable, where Fπs− = FBs ∨
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Hj % FBs ∨Hj−1 = F˜πs−, where the BSDE is considered with respect to the
filtration F˜π. However, from the both BSDEs
dY t,x;u,vr =−E[f(r,Xt,x;u,vr , Y t,x;u,vr ,Zt,x;u,vr , ur, vr)|F˜πr ]dr
+Zt,x;u,vr dBr + dM
t,x;u,v
r ,
Y t,x;u,vT =E[Φ(X
t,x;u,v
T )|F˜πT−]
(3.29)
and 
dY s,x;u,vr =−E[f(r,Xs,x;u,vr , Y s,x;u,vr ,Zs,x;u,vr , ur, vr)|F˜πr ]dr
+Zs,x;u,vr dBr + dM
s,x;u,v
r ,
Y s,x;u,vT =E[Φ(X
s,x;u,v
T )|F˜πT−],
(3.30)
both studied over the time interval [s,T ], we deduce with standard BSDE
estimates that (or, refer to [5])
E[|Y t,x;uε,vεs − Y s,x;u
ε,vε
s |2]
≤CE
[
sup
r∈[s,T ]
|Xt,x;uε,vεr −Xs,x;u
ε,vε
r |2
]
(3.31)
≤CE[|Xt,x;uε,vεs − x|2]≤C(s− t)
(Recall that the coefficients σ and b are bounded and Lipschitz). Thus, from
BSDE (2.3), the boundedness of f(s,x, y,0, u, v), the Lipschitz continuity of
f(s,x, y, z, u, v) in z as well as (2.4),
W π(t, x)−W π(s,x)
≤E[|Y t,x;uε,vεs − Y s,x;u
ε,vε
s |] + |E[Y t,x;u
ε,vε
t − Y t,x;u
ε,vε
s ]|+ 2ε
≤C(s− t)1/2 +2ε
(3.32)
+ (s− t)1/2
(
E
[∫ s
t
|f(r,Xt,x;uε,vεr , Y t,x;u
ε,vε
r ,Z
t,x;uε,vε
r ,
uεr, v
ε
r)|2 dr
])1/2
≤C|s− t|1/2 +2ε,
for some constant C not depending on π and on ε. Thus, in virtue of the
arbitrariness of ε > 0 we have
W π(t, x)−W π(s,x)≤C|s− t|1/2.
Step 2. Now, for the same partition π, and the case 0 ≤ t < s ≤ T , we
make a lower estimate for W π(t, x)−W π(s,x). For this we notice that, for
arbitrarily given ε > 0 we can find α˜ε ∈Aπs,T such that, for all β˜ ∈ Bπs,T ,
W π(s,x)≤E[Jπ(s,x; α˜ε, β˜)] + ε.(3.33)
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For any fixed u0 ∈U we put u01 := u0I[t,s), and we define αε ∈Aπt,T by setting
αε(v) := u01 ⊕ α˜ε(v|[s,T ]), v ∈ Vπt,T . Let βε ∈ Bπt,T such that
W π(t, x)≥E[Jπ(t, x;αε, βε)]− ε,(3.34)
and let (uε, vε) ∈ Uπt,T × Vπt,T be associated with (αε, βε) through Lemma
2.1. On the other hand, by defining β˜ε ∈ Bπs,T by putting β˜ε(u2) = βε(u01 ⊕
u2)|[s,T ], u2 ∈ Uπs,T , it can be easily verified that (uε|[s,T ], vε|[s,T ]) ∈ Uπs,T × Vπs,T
is associated with (α˜ε, β˜ε) in the sense of Lemma 2.1. Consequently,
W π(s,x)≤ E[Jπ(s,x;uε, vε)] + ε,
(3.35)
W π(t, x)≥ E[Jπ(t, x;uε, vε)]− ε,
and we can proceed now in analogy to step 1 to deduce that
W π(t, x)−W π(s,x)≥−C|s− t|1/2.
Combining this result with that of step 1 we complete the proof. 
4. Value in mixed strategies and associated HJB–Isaacs equation. The
objective of this section is to study the limit of the lower and the upper value
functions W π and Uπ along a partition π, when the mesh of the partition
π tends to zero, and to show that both W π and Uπ converge uniformly on
compacts to the same limit function V which is the unique viscosity solution
of the following Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman–Isaac equation
∂
∂t
V (t, x) +H(t, x, (V,DV,D2V )(t, x)) = 0 (t, x) ∈ [0, T )×Rd,
V (T,x) = Φ(x), x ∈Rd,
(4.1)
with Hamiltonian
H(t, x, y, p,A)
= sup
µ∈P(U)
inf
ν∈P(V )
(4.2)
×
∫
U×V
(
1
2
tr(σσT (t, x, u, v)A) + b(t, x, u, v)p
+ f(t, x, y, p · σ(t, x, u, v), u, v)
)
µ⊗ ν(dudv),
(t, x, y, p,A) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd × R × Rd × Sd, where Sd denotes the space of
symmetric matrices from Rd×d. For this we need the following supplemen-
tary assumption which is coherent with our standard assumptions on the
coefficients σ, b and f .
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Condition 4.1. We suppose that either
• σ(s,x,u, v) = σ(s,x), (s,x,u, v) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd×U ×V is independent of the
controls; or
• f(s,x, y, z, u, v) is linear in z:
f(s,x, y, z, u, v) = f0(s,x, y, u, v) + f1(s)z,
(s,x, y, z, u, v) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd×R×Rd×U×V , where f0 = (f0(s,x, y, u, v)) :
[0, T ]×Rd×R×U ×V →R bounded, jointly continuous and Lipschitz in
(x, y), uniformly with respect to (s,u, v), and f1 : [0, T ]→Rd is continuous.
More precisely, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Under our standard assumptions on the coefficients σ, b, f
and Φ as well as Condition 4.1, we have the existence of a bounded, contin-
uous function V : [0, T ]×Rd→R such that, for every sequence of partitions
πn, n≥ 1, of the interval [0, T ] with mesh |πn| → 0, as n→+∞, W πn → V ,
and Uπn → V , uniformly on compacts, as n→+∞. Moreover, V is the vis-
cosity solution of PDE (4.1), unique in the class of continuous functions
with polynomial growth.
For the convenience of the reader, we recall briefly the definition of a vis-
cosity solution, which we give directly for PDE (4.1). The reader interested
in a more detailed description of the concept of viscosity solution is referred
to the overview paper by Crandall, Ishii and Lions [6].
Definition 4.1. A function V ∈C([0, T ]×Rd) is said to be:
(i) a viscosity subsolution of PDE (4.1), if, first, V (T,x) ≤ Φ(x), x ∈
Rd, and if, second, for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × Rd and any test function ϕ ∈
C1,2([0, T ] × Rd) such that V − ϕ achieves a local maximum at (t, x), it
holds
∂
∂t
ϕ(t, x) +H(t, x, (ϕ,∇ϕ,D2ϕ)(t, x))≥ 0;(4.3)
(ii) a viscosity supersolution of PDE (4.1), if, first, V (T,x) ≥ Φ(x), x ∈
Rd, and if, second, for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × Rd and any test function ϕ ∈
C1,2([0, T ] × Rd) such that V − ϕ achieves a local minimum at (t, x), it
holds
∂
∂t
ϕ(t, x) +H(t, x, (ϕ,∇ϕ,D2ϕ)(t, x))≤ 0;(4.4)
(iii) a viscosity solution of (4.1) if it is both a viscosity sub- but also a
viscosity supersolution of (4.1).
Remark 4.1. Let us point out that in Definition 4.1 the space
C1,2([0, T ]×Rd) of the test functions can be replaced by any subspace con-
taining C∞([0, T ]×Rd), as long as one can show the uniqueness with the help
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of C∞-test functions, as, for instance, done in [6]. Thus, our uniqueness re-
sults allows to restrict to a class of test functions, more adapted for our com-
putations, the space C3([0, T ]×Rd) of functions which are three times con-
tinuous differentiable with respect to (t, x). On the other hand, taking into
account the uniform boundedness of the functions W π,Uπ and, hence, also
of V , the standard argument of changing a test function ϕ ∈C3([0, T ]×Rd)
such that V −ϕ achieves a local extremum at (t, x), at the exterior of a small
ball around (t, x), allows to consider only test functions ϕ ∈C3ℓ,b([0, T ]×Rd),
that is, C3-functions with bounded derivatives of orders 1, 2 and 3 (and
which themselves have, consequently, a linear growth).
Following the arguments developed, for example, in Stro¨mberg [19] The-
orem 5, we have the following comparison principle.
Proposition 4.1. Let us suppose our standard assumptions on the coef-
ficients σ, b, f and Φ, and let V1, V2 : [0, T ]×Rd→R be continuous functions
having a growth not exceeding that of exp{γ|x|}, for some γ > 0. Then, if V1
is a viscosity subsolution and V2 a viscosity supersolution of (4.1), we have
V1(t, x)≤ V2(t, x), (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd.
Remark 4.2. Let us emphasize that the condition of exponential growth
is optimal for the uniqueness of the continuous viscosity solution, as long
as σ is bounded; this is the case due to our assumptions. However, the
assumption of bounded coefficients and so, in particular, that of σ, has been
imposed in order to simplify our argument. Our approach can be extended
without major difficulties to coefficients σ of linear growth. In this case the
class of continuous functions V within which one has the uniqueness of the
viscosity solution is smaller than that of the above Proposition 4.1; it’s that
of V such that, for some γ > 0,
lim
|x|→+∞
V (t, x) exp{−γ(log(|x|+ 1))2}= 0
(4.5)
uniformly with respect to t ∈ [0, T ];
see, for example, [3].
As a direct consequence of this comparison principle, we have the following
corollary.
Corollary 4.1. PDE (4.1) has at most one continuous viscosity so-
lution V : [0, T ] × Rd → R with exponential growth, that is, satisfying the
condition that, for suitable γ > 0,
lim
|x|→+∞
V (t, x) exp{−γ|x|}= 0
(4.6)
uniformly with respect to t ∈ [0, T ].
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In particular, uniqueness holds within the class of continuous functions with
polynomial growth.
All what follows will be devoted to the proof of Theorem 4.1. The proof
will be given through a sequel of auxiliary results.
Let us begin by choosing an arbitrary sequence of partitions πn := {0 =
tn0 < t
n
1 < · · · < tnNn = T}, n ≥ 1, of the interval [0, T ] such that |πn| :=
sup1≤i≤Nn(ti− ti−1)→ 0, as n→+∞. Then, from Lemma 3.2 and Proposi-
tion 3.2, we see that the family of functions (W πn ,Uπn), n≥ 1, is uniformly
Lipschitz in x, uniformly with respect to t, and Ho¨lder continuous in t, uni-
formly with respect to x. Consequently, the following result follows from the
Arzela`–Ascoli theorem combined with a standard diagonalization argument.
Lemma 4.1. There exists a subsequence of partitions, which we denote
again by (πn)n≥1, as well as bounded continuous functions W,U : [0, T ] ×
Rd→R such that (W πn ,Uπn)→ (W,U), uniformly on compacts in [0, T ]×
Rd. Moreover,
|W (t, x)−W (t′, x′)|+ |U(t, x)−U(t′, x′)| ≤C(|t− t′|1/2 + |x− x′|),(4.7)
(t, x), (t′, x′) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd, where C is a constant which does not depend on
the choice of the sequence of partitions πn, n≥ 1.
Although the functions W,U given by the above lemma depend a priori
on the choice of the sequence of partitions πn, n≥ 1, as well as on the subse-
quence with respect to which (W πn ,Uπn) converges, we will show later that
W,U are universal and coincide even.
Inspired by the approach in [3] we put, for some arbitrarily chosen but
fixed ϕ ∈C3ℓ,b([0, T ]×Rd),
F (s,x, y, z, u, v) = f(s,x, y+ ϕ(s,x), z +Dϕ(s,x) · σ(s,x,u, v), u, v)
(4.8)
+Lϕ(s,x,u, v),
(s,x, y, z, u, v) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd ×R×Rd ×U × V , where
Lϕ(s,x,u, v)
(4.9)
:=
∂
∂s
ϕ(s,x) +
1
2
tr(σσT (s,x,u, v)D2ϕ) +Dϕ · b(s,x,u, v).
Let us now fix arbitrarily (t, x) ∈ [0, T )×Rd. Given an arbitrary partition
π = {0 = t0 < t1 < · · ·< tn = T}, we let 1≤ j ≤ n be such that t < tj . Let us
investigate the following BSDE defined on the interval [t, tj] :
dY 1,u,vs =−E[Lϕ(s,Xt,x;u,vs , us, vs)|F˜πs ]ds
−E[f(s,Xt,x;u,vs , Y 1,u,vs +E[ϕ(s,Xt,x;u,vs )|F˜πs ],Z1,u,vs
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+E[∇ϕ(s,Xt,x;u,vs )σ(s,Xt,x;u,vs , us, vs)|F˜πs ], us, vs)|F˜πs ]ds(4.10)
+Z1,u,vs dBs + dM
1,u,v
s ,
Y 1,u,vtj = 0,M
1,u,v martingale orthogonal to B,M1,u,vt = 0,
where the process Xt,x;u,v is the unique solution of SDE (2.1) and (u, v) ∈
Uπt,tj ×Vπt,tj .
It can be easily verified that (or, refer to [5]), under our standard assump-
tions on the coefficients σ, b and f , the above BSDE has a unique solution
(Y 1,u,v,Z1,u,v,M1,u,v) over the time interval [t, tj].
We have the following relation between the solution Y 1,u,v and the back-
ward stochastic semigroup Gt,x;u,vs,tj [ϕ(tj ,X
t,x;u,v
tj
)]:
Lemma 4.2. For every s ∈ [t, tj ], it holds
Y 1,u,vs =G
t,x;u,v
s,tj
[ϕ(tj,X
t,x;u,v
tj
)]−E[ϕ(s,Xt,x;u,vs )|F˜πs ], P -a.s.,(4.11)
and in particular, for s= t,
Y 1,u,vt =G
t,x;u,v
t,tj
[ϕ(tj ,X
t,x;u,v
tj
)]− ϕ(t, x), P -a.s.(4.12)
Proof. Recall that Gt,x;u,vs,tj [ϕ(tj ,X
t,x;u,v
tj
)] is defined through the BSDE
dY u,vs =−E[f(s,Xt,x;u,vs , Y u,vs ,Zu,vs , us, vs)|F˜πs ]ds
+Zu,vs dBs + dM
u,v
s ,
Y u,vtj =E[ϕ(tj,X
t,x;u,v
tj
)|F˜πtj ], s ∈ [t, tj ],
Mu,v square integrable martingale, orthogonal to B,Mu,vt = 0,
(4.13)
by the relation:
Gt,x;u,vs,tj [ϕ(tj,X
t,x;u,v
tj
)] = Y u,vs , s ∈ [t, tj ].(4.14)
We notice that, since Xt,x;u,v is Fπ-adapted, we have
E[ϕ(s,Xt,x;u,vs )|F˜πs ] =E[ϕ(s,Xt,x;u,vs )|FBT ∨Hℓ−1],(4.15)
s ∈ [t ∨ tℓ−1, t ∨ tℓ),1 ≤ ℓ ≤ j. Hence, with the help of the Itoˆ formula we
obtain on each interval [t ∨ tℓ−1, t ∨ tℓ),1≤ ℓ≤ j,
dE[ϕ(s,Xt,x;u,vs )|F˜πs ]
=E[Lϕ(s,Xt,x;u,vs , us, vs)|F˜πs ]ds(4.16)
+E[∇ϕ(s,Xt,x;u,vs )σ(s,Xt,x;u,vs , us, vs)|F˜πs ]dBs.
Let us put
Ms :=
∑
ℓ :t<tℓ≤s
△E[ϕ(tℓ,Xt,x;u,vtℓ )|F˜πtℓ ], s ∈ [t, tj],
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with
△E[ϕ(tℓ,Xt,x;u,vtℓ )|F˜πtℓ ] =E[ϕ(tℓ,X
t,x;u,v
tℓ
)|F˜πtℓ ]−E[ϕ(tℓ,X
t,x;u,v
tℓ
)|F˜πtℓ−].
Obviously, M is a pure jump martingale with respect to the filtration FB
and, hence, orthogonal to B, and
dE[ϕ(s,Xt,x;u,vs )|F˜πs ]
=E[Lϕ(s,Xt,x;u,vs , us, vs)|F˜πs ]ds
(4.17)
+E[∇ϕ(s,Xt,x;u,vs )σ(s,Xt,x;u,vs , us, vs)|F˜πs ]dBs + dMs,
s ∈ [t, tj ].
Consequently, (Y u,vs −E[ϕ(s,Xt,x;u,vs )|F˜πs ],Zu,vs −E[∇ϕ(s,Xt,x;u,vs )σ(s,Xt,x;u,vs ,
us, vs)|F˜πs ],Mu,vs −Ms), t ≤ s ≤ tj , is a solution of BSDE (4.10). From its
uniqueness, we can conclude the statement of the lemma. 
Let us now simplify the preceding BSDE (4.10) by replacing the process
Xt,x;u,v by its initial value x. Then BSDE (4.10) takes the form
dY 2,u,vs =−E[F (s,x,Y 2,u,vs ,Z2,u,vs , us, vs)|F˜πs ]ds
+Z2,u,vs dBs + dM
2,u,v
s ,
Y 2,u,vtj = 0, s ∈ [t, tj ],
Mu,v square integrable martingale, orthogonal to B,Mu,vt = 0,
(4.18)
where (u, v) ∈ Uπt,tj ×Vπt,tj . As in the discussion of BSDE (4.10) we see that
the above BSDE has a unique solution. From the BSDEs (4.10) and (4.18),
we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3. For every (u, v) ∈ Uπt,tj ×Vπt,tj we have
|Y 1,u,vt − Y 2,u,vt | ≤C(tj − t)3/2, P -a.s.,(4.19)
where C is independent of the control processes u and v, but also independent
of the partition π.
Proof. Let (u, v) ∈ Uπt,tj ×Vπt,tj . Then, for all s ∈ [t, tj], thanks to Con-
dition 4.1,
E[Lϕ(s,x,us, vs)
+ f(s,x, y+ ϕ(s,x), z +E[∇ϕ(s,x)σ(s,x,us, vs)|F˜πs ], us, vs)|F˜πs ]
=E[Lϕ(s,x,us, vs)(4.20)
+ f(s,x, y+ϕ(s,x), z +∇ϕ(s,x)σ(s,x,us, vs), us, vs)|F˜πs ]
=E[F (s,x, y, z, us, vs)|F˜πs ], P -a.s.
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Consequently, we have to compare the solution of BSDE (4.10)
dY 1,u,vs
=−E[Lϕ(s,Xt,x;u,vs , us, vs)
+ f(s,Xt,x;u,vs , Y
1,u,v
s +E[ϕ(s,X
t,x;u,v
s )|F˜πs ],Z1,u,vs(4.21)
+E[∇ϕ(s,Xt,x;u,vs )σ(s,Xt,x;u,vs , us, vs)|F˜πs ], us, vs)|F˜πs ]ds
+Z1,u,vs dBs + dM
1,u,v
s , Y
1,u,v
tj
= 0,
with that of BSDE (4.18) which can be rewritten as
dY 2,u,vs =−E[Lϕ(s,x,us, vs)
+ f(s,x,Y 2,u,vs +E[ϕ(s,x)|F˜πs ],Z2,u,vs
(4.22)
+E[∇ϕ(s,x)σ(s,x,us, vs)|F˜πs ], us, vs)|F˜πs ]ds
+Z2,u,vs dBs + dM
2,u,v
s , Y
2,u,v
tj
= 0,
and from BSDE standard estimates we deduce
|Y 1,u,vt − Y 2,u,vt |2 +E
[∫ tj
t
|Z1,u,vr −Z2,u,vr |2 dr
∣∣∣F˜πt ]
+E
[ ∑
ℓ≤j;t<tℓ
|△M1,u,vtℓ −△M
2,u,v
tℓ
|2
∣∣∣F˜πt ]
(4.23)
≤CE
[(∫ tj
t
|Xt,x;u,vr − x|dr
)2∣∣∣F˜πt ]
≤C(tj − t)3, P -a.s.,
where the constant C depends only on the boundedness and Lipschitz con-
stants of the coefficients and the derivatives of ϕ, but not on j nor the
considered partition π. 
Let us now state the following crucial lemma which, although inspired by
Lemma 4.3 in [3], differs heavily because of the different framework studied
here.
Lemma 4.4. Let Y 0 = (Y 0s )s∈[t,tj ] denote the unique solution of the fol-
lowing ordinary backward differential equation:{
−Y˙ 0s = F0(s,x,Y 0s ,0), s ∈ [t, tj ],
Y 0tj = 0,
(4.24)
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where, for (s, y, z) ∈ [t, tj]×R×Rd,
F0(s,x, y, z) := sup
µ∈P(U)
(
inf
v∈V
F (s,x, y, z,µ, v)
)
= sup
µ∈P(U)
(
inf
ν∈P(V )
F (s,x, y, z,µ, ν)
)
(4.25)
×
(
= inf
ν∈P(V )
sup
µ∈P(U)
F (s,x, y, z,µ, ν)
)
.
Then, for all s ∈ [t, tj], P -a.s.,
Y 0s = ess sup
u∈Uπt,tj
ess inf
v∈Vπt,tj
Y 2,u,vs = ess inf
v∈Vπt,tj
ess sup
u∈Uπt,tj
Y 2,u,vs .(4.26)
Proof. Step 1. Given (u, v) ∈ Uπt,tj × Vπt,tj , let (Y 2,u,v,Z2,u,v,M2,u,v)
be the unique solution of BSDE (4.18). We recall that, for all s ∈ [t ∨
tℓ−1, tℓ), (1≤ ℓ≤ j), (Y 2,u,vs ,Z2,u,vs ,M2,u,vs ) is F˜πs (=FBs ∨Hℓ−1)-measurable,
us is Fπ,1s (=FBs ∨Hℓ−1∨σ{ζℓ,1})-measurable and vs is Fπ,2s (=FBs ∨Hℓ−1∨
σ{ζℓ,2})-measurable. Consequently, knowing F˜πs , us and vs are conditionally
independent, and defining
µus (A) := P{us ∈A|F˜πs }, νvs (B) := P{vs ∈B|F˜πs },
A ∈ B(U),B ∈ B(V ),
we have
E[F (s,x,Y 2,u,vs ,Z
2,u,v
s , us, vs)|F˜πs ]
= F (s,x,Y 2,u,vs ,Z
2,u,v
s , µ
u
s , ν
v
s )(4.27)
×
(
:=
∫
U×V
F (s,x,Y 2,u,vs ,Z
2,u,v
s , u
′, v′)µus ⊗ νvs (du′ dv′)
)
.
Indeed, this relation can be easily checked by considering first instead
of F (s,x,Y 2,u,vs ,Z
2,u,v
s , us, vs) integrands of the form ξsf1(us)f2(vs), ξs ∈
L∞(Ω, F˜πs , P ) and f1, f2 bounded Borel functions over U and V , respec-
tively, and applying later a Monotonic Class theorem.
Hence, with the notation F (s,x, y, z,µ, v) :=
∫
U F (s,x, y, z, u
′, v)µ(du′),
µ ∈ P(U), and with putting
F1(s,x, y, z,µ) := inf
v∈V
F (s,x, y, z,µ, v)
(
= inf
ν∈P(V )
F (s,x, y, z,µ, ν)
)
,
(s, y, z,µ) ∈ [0, T ]×R×Rd ×P(U), we obtain
E[F (s,x,Y 2,u,vs ,Z
2,u,v
s , us, vs)|F˜πs ]
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=
∫
V
F (s,x,Y 2,u,vs ,Z
2,u,v
s , µ
u
s , v
′)νvs (dv
′)(4.28)
≥ F1(s,x,Y 2,u,vs ,Z2,u,vs , µus ), ds dP -a.e.
Consequently, denoting by (Y 3,u,Z3,u,M3,u) ∈ S2
F˜π
(t, tj;R) × L2F˜π(t, tj ;
Rd)×M2
F˜π
(t, tj;R) the unique solution of the BSDE
dY 3,us =−F1(s,x,Y 3,us ,Z3,us , µus )ds
+Z3,us dBs + dM
3,u
s , s ∈ [t, tj],
Y 3,utj = 0,
M3,u square integrable martingale, orthogonal to B,M3,ut = 0,
(4.29)
we deduce from the comparison theorem for BSDEs (refer to [5], for classical
case it can be referred to [18], or [3]) that Y 2,u,vs ≥ Y 3,us , s ∈ [t, tj], P -a.s., for
all v ∈ Vπt,tj . For this, we observe that F1(s,x, y, z,µ) is a jointly continuous
function over [0, T ]×Rd ×R×Rd ×P(U), which is Lipschitz in (y, z), uni-
formly with respect to (s,x,µ). Thus, taking into account the arbitrariness
of v ∈ Vπt,tj , we deduce
Y 3,us ≤ ess inf
v∈Vπt,tj
Y 2,u,vs , P -a.s, s ∈ [t, tj ].(4.30)
Let us show that we have even equality in the above inequality. For this
we observe that, since the function F is continuous over [t, tj]×Rd ×R×
Rd × P(U) × V , there exists a Borel measurable function v∗ : [t, tj ] × R ×
Rd ×P(U)→ V such that
F1(s,x, y, z,µ) = inf
v∈V
F (s,x, y, z,µ, v) = F (s,x, y, z,µ, v∗(s, y, z,µ)),
(s, y, z,µ) ∈ [t, tj ]×R×Rd ×P(U). With the help of this measurable func-
tion, we introduce the control process v∗s := v
∗(s,Y 3,us ,Z
3,u
s , µus ), s ∈ [t, tj]. We
notice that v∗ = (v∗s)s∈[t,tj ] belongs to Vπt,tj and is even F˜π-adapted. Thus,
E[F (s,x,Y 3,us ,Z
3,u
s , us, v
∗
s)|F˜πs ]
= F (s,x,Y 3,us ,Z
3,u
s , µ
u
s , v
∗
s)(4.31)
= F1(s,x,Y
3,u
s ,Z
3,u
s , µ
u
s ), ds dP -a.e.,
from where we see that (Y 3,u,Z3,u,M3,u) is a solution of BSDE (4.18) driven
by the couple (u, v∗) ∈ Uπt,tj ×Vπt,tj of admissible controls. Consequently, the
uniqueness of the solution of BSDE (4.18) yields that Y 2,u,v
∗
s = Y
3,u
s , s ∈
[t, tj ], and from (4.30) we obtain:
Y 3,us = ess inf
v∈Vπt,tj
Y 2,u,vs , P -a.s, s ∈ [t, tj], u ∈ Uπt,tj .(4.32)
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Step 2. We begin with showing the latter relation in (4.25). For this end
we remark that, for all (s, y, z), the function (µ, ν)→ F (s,x, y, z,µ, ν) =∫
U
∫
V F (s,x, y, z, u, v)ν(dv)µ(du), (µ, ν) ∈ P(U) × P(V ), is bi-linear and,
hence, concave-convex in (µ, ν) belonging to the cross product P(U)×P(V )
of two convex compact spaces. Consequently, this mapping admits a saddle
point, and it follows in particular that the order of supµ∈P(U) and infν∈P(V )
is exchangeable without changing the value of F0(s,x, y, z).
Let us now consider an arbitrary u ∈ Uπt,tj . From the definition of the
function F0(s,x, y, z) and that of F1(s,x, y, z,µ), we have
F0(s,x, y, z)
= sup
µ∈P(U)
F1(s,x, y, z,µ)(4.33)
≥ F1(s,x, y, z,µus ), (s, y, z) ∈ [t, tj]×R×Rd, u ∈ Uπt,tj .
Consequently, since (Y 0,0) can be regarded as the solution of the BSDE
dY 0s =−F0(s,x,Y 0s ,0)ds+ 0 · dBs, s ∈ [t, tj ], Y 0tj = 0,
we get from the comparison theorem for BSDEs that Y 0s ≥ Y 3,us , s ∈ [t, tj], P -
a.s. Hence, in view of the arbitrariness of the choice of u ∈ Uπt,tj , it follows
that
Y 0s ≥ ess sup
u∈Uπt,tj
Y 3,us , P -a.s., s ∈ [t, tj].(4.34)
It remains to prove that we have even equality in this latter relation. For
this end, we notice that thanks to the uniform continuity of the function
(s, y,µ)→ F1(s,x, y,0, µ) over [t, tj ]×R×P(U) [we note that x in F1(s,x, y,
0, µ) is fixed], and the compactness of P(U) endowed with the topology gen-
erated by the weak convergence, we have the existence of a Borel measurable
selection µ∗ = (µ∗(s, y)) : [t, tj]×R→P(U) such that
F0(s,x, y,0) = F1(s,x, y,0, µ
∗(s, y)), (s, y) ∈ [t, tj ]×R.
Again from the uniform continuity of (s, y,µ)→ F1(s,x, y,0, µ), we get
that, for arbitrarily given ε > 0 there is some δ(= δε)> 0 such that |F1(s,x,
y,0, µ) − F1(s′, x, y′,0, µ)| ≤ ε, for all µ ∈ P(U) and all (s, y), (s′, y′) with
|(s, y)− (s′, y′)| ≤ δ. Let (∆ℓ)ℓ≥1 be a Borel partition of the set [t, tj]×R,
composed of nonempty sets ∆ℓ with diameter less than or equal to δ. For
every ℓ≥ 1, let us fix arbitrarily an element (sℓ, yℓ) of ∆ℓ, and let us put µℓ :=
µ∗(sℓ, yℓ). Moreover, let us consider an independent sequence of random
variables ξℓ ∈ L0(Ω, σ{ζj,1}, P ;U) such that, for all ℓ≥ 1, the law P ◦ [ξℓ]−1
coincides with µℓ.
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With the above introduced quantities, we define the control process
u∗s :=
∑
ℓ≥1
I{(s,Y 0s ) ∈∆ℓ} · ξℓ, s ∈ [t, tj].
Such defined process belongs, obviously, to Uπt,tj . Moreover, we observe
that, for all s ∈ [t, tj], u∗s is σ{ζj,1}-measurable and, consequently, indepen-
dent of F˜πs . Hence, for all A ∈ B(U),
µu
∗
s (A) = P{u∗s ∈A|F˜πs }= P{u∗s ∈A}
(4.35)
=
∑
ℓ≥1
I{(s,Y 0s ) ∈∆ℓ}µℓ(A).
It follows that µu
∗
s =
∑
ℓ≥1 I{(s,Y 0s ) ∈∆ℓ}µℓ. Hence, due to our choice of
the partition ∆ℓ, ℓ≥ 1,
F0(s,x,Y
0
s ,0)≤ ε+
∑
ℓ≥1
I{(s,Y 0s ) ∈∆ℓ}F0(sℓ, x, yℓ,0)
= ε+
∑
ℓ≥1
I{(s,Y 0s ) ∈∆ℓ}F1(sℓ, x, yℓ,0, µℓ)(4.36)
= ε+
∑
ℓ≥1
I{(s,Y 0s ) ∈∆ℓ}F1(sℓ, x, yℓ,0, µu
∗
s )
≤ 2ε+F1(s,x,Y 0s ,0, µu
∗
s ), s ∈ [t, tj].
Let us compare now Y 0 with the solution (Y 3,u
∗
,Z3,u
∗
) of BSDE (4.29)
controlled by u∗ ∈ Uπt,tj . Obviously,
d(Y 0s − Y 3,u
∗
s ) =−(F0(s,x,Y 0s ,0)−F1(s,x,Y 3,u
∗
s ,Z
3,u∗
s , µ
u∗
s ))ds
−Z3,u∗s dBs − dM3,u
∗
s ,
s ∈ [t, tj ], Y 0tj − Y 3,u
∗
tj
= 0, and from the Itoˆ formula,
d((Y 0s − Y 3,u
∗
s )
+)2
=−2(Y 0s − Y 3,u
∗
s )
+(F0(s,x,Y
0
s ,0)−F1(s,x,Y 3,u
∗
s ,Z
3,u∗
s , µ
u∗
s ))ds
(4.37)
+ |Z3,u∗s |2I{Y 0s − Y 3,u
∗
s > 0}ds− 2(Y 0s − Y 3,u
∗
s )
+Z3,u
∗
s dBs
+ I{Y 0s − Y 3,u
∗
s > 0}d[M3,u
∗
]s − 2(Y 0s − Y 3,u
∗
s )
+dM3,u
∗
s ,
and from standard estimates combined with (4.36) we get
((Y 0s − Y 3,u
∗
s )
+)2 +E
[∫ tj
s
|Z3,u∗r |2I{Y 0r − Y 3,u
∗
r > 0}dr
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+
∫
(s,tj ]
I{Y 0r − Y 3,u
∗
r > 0}d[M3,u
∗
]r
∣∣∣F˜πs ]
= 2E
[∫ tj
s
(Y 0r − Y 3,u
∗
r )
+(F0(r, x,Y
0
r ,0)
−F1(r, x,Y 3,u∗r ,Z3,u
∗
r , µ
u∗
r ))dr
∣∣∣F˜πs ]
≤ 2E
[∫ tj
s
(Y 0r − Y 3,u
∗
r )
+(2ε+ F1(r, x,Y
0
r ,0, µ
u∗
r )(4.38)
−F1(r, x,Y 3,u∗r ,Z3,u
∗
r , µ
u∗
r ))dr
∣∣∣F˜πs ]
≤ 2E
[∫ tj
s
(Y 0r − Y 3,u
∗
r )
+(2ε+C|Y 0r − Y 3,u
∗
r |+C|Z3,u
∗
r |)dr
∣∣∣F˜πs ]
≤ ε2 +CE
[∫ tj
s
((Y 0r − Y 3,u
∗
r )
+)2 dr
∣∣∣F˜πs ]
+
1
2
E
[∫ tj
s
|Z3,u∗r |2I{Y 0r − Y 3,u
∗
r > 0}dr
∣∣∣F˜πs ].
Hence, from Gronwall’s lemma, we see that, for some constant C inde-
pendent of ε, (Y 0s − Y 3,u
∗
s )+ ≤Cε, s ∈ [t, tj], that is,
Y 0s ≤ Y 3,u
∗
s +Cε, s ∈ [t, tj ], P -a.s.
This latter relation together with (4.34) yields
Y 0s = ess sup
u∈Uπt,tj
Y 3,us , P -a.s., s ∈ [t, tj].
Recalling the result of step 1 we can conclude the first relation of the
lemma. The second one follows by a symmetric argument. 
After the above auxiliary lemmas, we are now able to characterize the
functions W and U introduced by Lemma 4.1 as viscosity solution of PDE
(4.1).
Lemma 4.5. The functions W,U : [0, T ] × Rd → R coincide and solve
PDE (4.1) in viscosity sense.
Proof. Step 1. Let us show in this step that the function W introduced
in Lemma 4.1 as the uniform limit on compacts of a suitable sequence of
lower value functions W πn, n≥ 1, is a viscosity supersolution of (4.1).
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For this, we fix arbitrarily (t, x) ∈ [0, T )×Rd and we let ϕ ∈C3ℓ,b([0, T ]×
Rd) be such that W −ϕ≥W (t, x)−ϕ(t, x) = 0 on [0, T )×Rd. Let ρ > 0 be
arbitrarily small and K > 0 sufficiently large. Since W πn, n ≥ 1, converges
uniformly on compacts to W , there is some nρ,K ≥ 1 such that, for all n≥
nρ,K , |W (s,x′)−W πn(s,x′)| ≤ ρ, for every (s,x′) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd with |x′−x| ≤
K. Then it follows from the DPP (Theorem 3.2) that, for all n≥ nρ,K and
every tnj ∈ πn with t < tnj ≤ T ,
ϕ(t, x) + ρ=W (t, x) + ρ
≥W πn(t, x)(4.39)
= ess sup
α∈Aπn
t,tn
j
ess inf
β∈Bπn
t,tn
j
Gt,x;α,βt,tnj
(W πn(tnj ,X
t,x;α,β
tnj
)).
On the other hand, taking into account that the functions W πn , n ≥ 1,
are bounded, uniformly with respect to n≥ 1 and W is bounded, we have,
for some constant C0 (independent of n),
W πn(tnj ,X
t,x;α,β
tnj
)
≥W (tnj ,Xt,x;α,βtnj )− ρ− 2C0I{|X
t,x;α,β
tnj
− x|>K}(4.40)
≥ ϕ(tnj ,Xt,x;α,βtnj )− ρ− 2C0I{|X
t,x;α,β
tnj
− x|>K},
for all α ∈Aπnt,tnj , β ∈ B
πn
t,tnj
, and from the comparison theorem as well as BSDE
standard estimates (refer to [5]) applied to the BSDE defining our backward
stochastic semigroup we obtain
ϕ(t, x) + ρ≥ ess sup
α∈Aπn
t,tn
j
ess inf
β∈Bπn
t,tn
j
Gt,x;α,βt,tnj
(W πn(tnj ,X
t,x;α,β
tnj
))
≥ ess sup
α∈Aπn
t,tn
j
ess inf
β∈Bπn
t,tn
j
×Gt,x;α,βt,tnj (ϕ(t
n
j ,X
t,x;α,β
tnj
)− ρ− 2C0I{|Xt,x;α,βtnj − x|>K})
(4.41)
≥ ess sup
α∈Aπn
t,tn
j
ess inf
β∈Bπn
t,tn
j
Gt,x;α,βt,tnj
(ϕ(tnj ,X
t,x;α,β
tnj
))
− ess sup
α∈Aπn
t,tn
j
,β∈Bπn
t,tn
j
×L(E[(ρ+2C0I{|Xt,x;α,βtnj − x|>K})
2|F˜πnt ])1/2,
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where the constant L depends only on the coefficient f . However, since
E[(ρ+2C0I{|Xt,x;α,βtn
j
− x|>K})2|F˜πnt ]
≤ 2ρ2 +8C20
1
K2
E[|Xt,x;α,βtnj − x|
2|F˜πnt ](4.42)
≤ 2ρ2 + C
K2
(α,β) ∈Aπnt,tnj ×B
πn
t,tnj
, n≥ 1
(Recall that the coefficients σ and b of the dynamics of the game are bounded),
we get for K := 1/ρ, for all n≥ nρ := nρ,K ,
ϕ(t, x) +Cρ≥ ess sup
α∈Aπn
t,tn
j
ess inf
β∈Bπn
t,tn
j
Gt,x;α,βt,tnj
(ϕ(tnj ,X
t,x;α,β
tnj
)),(4.43)
where C ∈ R is a constant independent of ρ, n and tnj . From the latter
estimate, we deduce with the help of Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 that
Cρ≥ ess sup
α∈Aπn
t,tn
j
ess inf
β∈Bπn
t,tn
j
(Gt,x;α,βt,tnj
(ϕ(tnj ,X
t,x;α,β
tnj
))−ϕ(t, x))
= ess sup
α∈Aπn
t,tn
j
ess inf
β∈Bπn
t,tn
j
Y 1,α,βt(4.44)
≥ ess sup
α∈Aπn
t,tn
j
ess inf
β∈Bπn
t,tn
j
Y 2,α,βt −C(tnj − t)3/2, P -a.s.
Of course, as before, the quantities Y 1,α,βt , Y
2,α,β
t have to be understood
as Y 1,u,vt , Y
2,u,v
t for (u, v) ∈ Uπnt,tnj ×V
πn
t,tnj
associated with (α,β) ∈Aπnt,tnj ×B
πn
t,tnj
through Lemma 2.1. Moreover, they are defined by Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 for
tj = t
n
j , that is, they depend on the choice of t
n
j ∈ πn and so, in particular, n≥
nρ. Obviously, since Uπnt,tnj can be regarded as a subset of A
πn
t,tnj
by identifying
u ∈ Uπnt,tnj with the NAD strategy α
u(v) := u, v ∈ Vπnt,tnj ,
Cρ+C(tnj − t)3/2 ≥ ess sup
α∈Aπn
t,tn
j
ess inf
β∈Bπn
t,tn
j
Y 2,α,βt
≥ ess sup
u∈Uπn
t,tn
j
ess inf
β∈Bπn
t,tn
j
Y
2,u,β(u)
t
(4.45)
≥ ess sup
u∈Uπn
t,tn
j
ess inf
v∈Vπn
t,tn
j
Y 2,u,vt
= Y 0t , P -a.s., n≥ nρ,
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where the latter equality was stated in Lemma 4.4. Remark that here, of
course, Y 0 is defined by Lemma 4.4 for tnj . Since
Y 0s =
∫ tnj
s
F0(r, x,Y
0
r ,0)dr, s ∈ [t, tnj ]
and F0(r, x, y,0) is bounded, continuous, and Lipschitz in y, uniformly with
respect to r, it follows that |Y 0s | ≤C(tnj − t), s ∈ [t, tnj ], and
1
tnj − t
Y 0t =
1
tnj − t
∫ tnj
t
F0(r, x,Y
0
r ,0)dr
≥ 1
tnj − t
∫ tnj
t
(F0(r, x,0,0)−L|Y 0r |)dr(4.46)
≥ 1
tnj − t
∫ tnj
t
F0(r, x,0,0)dr −C(tnj − t).
Let ρ≤ (T−t)3/2. Since the mesh |πn| of the partition πn converges to zero
as n→+∞, we can find for n≥ nρ large enough some tnj ∈ πn, tnj > t, such
that (tnj − t)3/2/2 ≤ ρ ≤ (tnj − t)3/2. Consequently, for n ≥ nρ large enough
we can conclude from (4.45) and (4.46) that
C(tnj − t)1/2 ≥
1
tnj − t
Y 0t ≥
1
tnj − t
∫ tnj
t
F0(r, x,0,0)dr −C(tnj − t).
Thus, taking the limit as ρ→ 0 (and, hence, n→+∞ and tnj − t→ 0), we
obtain F0(t, x,0,0)≤ 0. But recalling the definition of F0 from Lemma 4.4,
we see that
0≥ F0(t, x,0,0) = sup
µ∈P(U)
inf
ν∈P(V )
F (t, x, y, z,µ, ν)
= sup
µ∈P(U)
inf
ν∈P(V )
×
∫
U×V
(
∂
∂t
ϕ(t, x) +
1
2
tr(σσT (t, x, u, v)D2ϕ)
(4.47)
+Dϕ.b(t, x, u, v)
+ f(t, x,ϕ(t, x),Dϕ(t, x) · σ(t, x, u, v), u, v)
)
µ⊗ ν(dudv)
=
∂
∂t
ϕ(t, x) +H(t, x, (ϕ,Dϕ,D2ϕ)(t, x)).
Therefore, W is a viscosity supersolution of PDE (4.1).
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Step 2. With an argument symmetric to that developed in step 1 we
show that U is a viscosity subsolution of PDE (4.1). Since both W and
U are bounded continuous solutions, W is a viscosity supersolution and U
is a viscosity subsolution of (4.1), it follows from the comparison principle
(Proposition 4.1) that W ≥ U on [0, T ] × Rd. On the other hand, (W,U)
is the pointwise limit over the sequence (W πn ,Uπn), n≥ 1, where the lower
value function W πn along the partition πn is less than or equal to the upper
one Uπn , for all n ≥ 1. Consequently, W and U coincide, and both are
viscosity solutions of PDE (4.1). Again from the comparison principle it
follows that this viscosity solution W = U = V is the unique one inside the
class of continuous unions with at most polynomial growth. 
The above lemma allows now to prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof. From our above discussion, we have seen that for any arbitrary
sequence of partitions πn, n≥ 1, with |πn| → 0, as n→+∞, there is a subse-
quence which, abusing notation, we have also denoted by πn, n≥ 1, such that
W πn as well as Uπn converge uniformly on compacts to the unique viscosity
solution V of PDE (4.1) (uniqueness in the class of continuous functions
with polynomial growth); see Lemma 4.5. Consequently, the limit V does
not depend on the special choice of the sequence of partitions πn, n ≥ 1.
Consequently, W πn as well as Uπn converge uniformly on compacts to the
unique viscosity solution V , for all sequence of partitions πn, n ≥ 1 with
mesh |πn| → 0, as n→+∞. The proof is complete. 
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